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Date: 10/1/2015 
Time: 01 :31 PM 
Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County 
ROA Report 
User: CRY ST AL 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-2014-0000784 Current Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation 
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation 
Date 
12/4/2014 
12/10/2014 
12/15/2014 
12/17/2014 
12/23/2014 
12/31/2014 
1/20/2015 
2/24/2015 
3/3/2015 
3/30/2015 
4/3/2015 
4/7/2015 
4/22/2015 
5/4/2015 
Other Claims 
Judge 
New Case Filed - Other Claims Robert J. Elgee 
Plaintiff: Warner, Susan Jane Appearance Andrew Parnes Robert J. Elgee 
Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review or cross appeal or Robert J. Elgee 
cross-petition from commission, board, or body to district court Paid by: 
Andrew Parnes Receipt number: 0007172 Dated: 12/4/2014 Amount: 
$221.00 (Check) For: Warner, Susan Jane (plaintiff) 
Petition for Judicial Review Robert J. Elgee 
Order Staying License Suspension and Setting Show Cause Hearing Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 12/15/2014 09:30 AM) Robert J. Elgee 
Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review of Agency Action By District Robert J. Elgee 
Court 
Defendant: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation Appearance 
Timothy J. Stover 
Notice Of Appearance 
Notice of Non-Objection to Order Staying License Suspension 
Hearing result for Order to Show Cause scheduled on 12/15/2014 09:30 
AM: Hearing Vacated 
Notice of Lodging of Agency Record 
Notice of Court Reporter's Estimate 
Notice of Filing Agency Record 
Lodged/Agency Record 
Notice of Filing Transcript 
Amended Notice of Filing Agency Record 
Lodged/Amended Agency Record 
Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review 
Respondent's Brief 
Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/04/2015 11 :00 AM) oral 
argument 
Notice of Oral Argument 
Respondent's Augmentation of Brief 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing date: 5/4/2015 
Time: 10:59 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy 
Stover 
Party: Susan Lauer, Attorney: Andrew Parnes 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Date: 10/1/2015 
Time: 01 :31 PM 
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County 
ROA Report 
User: CRYSTAL 
Case: CV-2014-0000784 Current Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of 
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation 
Date 
5/4/2015 
6/25/2015 
7/1/2015 
7/9/2015 
7/16/2015 
7/20/2015 
7/27/2015 
7/28/2015 
8/24/2015 
9/14/2015 
Other Claims 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 05/04/2015 
11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Decision On Appeal 
No Longer U/A 
Order of Remand to Idaho Department of Transportation 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Robert J. Elgee 
Defendant; Lauer, Susan Jane, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/1/2015 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Robert J. Elgee 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Objection to Petitioner's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Objections Regarding Fees and Robert J. Elgee 
Costs 
Affidavit of Andrew Parnes in Support of Response to Respondent's Robert J. Elgee 
Objections Regarding Fees and Costs 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 08/24/2015 10:30 AM) attorney Robert J. Elgee 
fees 
Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee 
Court Minutes Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney fees and Costs 
Hearing date: 8/24/2015 
Time: 10:29 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy 
Stover 
Party: Susan Warner, Attorney: Andrew Parnes 
Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and Costs scheduled on Robert J. Elgee 
08/24/2015 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Stover- telephonic 
less 100 
Case Taken Under Advisement Robert J. Elgee 
No Longer U/A 
Memorandum Decision on Attorney Fees 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
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ANDREW PARNES 
Attorney at Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 726-1010 
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014- '1f1tj 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
Lie. No. ZA127717K 
ITD File No. MT TK1400262 
Fee Category: L-3 
Fee; $221.00 
Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, by and through her attorney of record, Andrew 
Parnes, petitions this Court for judicial review pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5270, et. seq. 
and I.R.C.P. 84, as follows: 
I. Judicial review is sought for a decision by the State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation. 
2. This Petition is taken is the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 
3 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Blaine as the Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, 
.......... .,....,.., in Blaine County. 
3. The action which is the object of this judicial review is the Idaho 
Transportation Department Order affirming a one year absolute driving suspension for 
Ms. Warner pursuant to LC. § 49-324. 
4. Ms. Warner was sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence 
charge in the State of Montana on September 16, 2016. She was convicted of a violation 
of Mt. Code§ 6I-8-465(l)(a), driving with a blood alcohol in excess of .16, specifically a 
.176. 
5. After the State of Montana notified the Idaho Transportation Department of 
the conviction, Ms. Warner was notified of a one year absolute suspension ofldaho 
driving privileges to take effect on October 9, 2014. The order of suspension was unclear 
on whether this suspension was based upon the Idaho aggravated driving under the 
influence or because Ms. Warner had a prior conviction for driving under the influence 
within the past ten years in the State of Idaho. 
6. Ms. Warner timely requested an administrative hearing, which was held on 
October 28, 2104, with hearing examiner, Michael Howell. At that hearing, Ms. Warner 
submitted a number of exhibits showing that the Montana offense was for a first offense 
driving under the influence, that the conviction was not for an excessive DUI of driving 
with more than a. 20 BAC, and argued that therefore the suspension in Idaho could be not 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 
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more than 90 days with the first 30 days absolute and the balance with restricted 
privileges. 
7. On October 31, 2014, the hearing officer entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law and Preliminary Order. 
8. Ms. Warner filed a timely petition for reconsideration on November 7, 
2014. 
9. On November 15, 2014, the hearing officer denied the petition for 
reconsideration and entered an order sustaining the one year absolute driving license 
suspension. Ms. Warner's driving privileges have been fully suspended since October 9, 
2014. 
10. A Statement of Issues for Judicial Review which Ms. Warner intends to 
assert include, but are not limited to the following: 
a. Does the State of Idaho have the authority to suspend a person's 
driving license for a conviction of first offense driving under the influence charge from 
another state when a similar conviction in the State of Idaho would only permit a 90 day 
license suspension, even if the driver had a prior DUI conviction within the preceding ten 
years? 
b. Whether I.C. § 18-8005(4(e) can apply to an out of state conviction 
for a first offense driving under the influence charge when it does not apply to a person so 
convicted in the State of Idaho? 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 
5 
c. Whether LC. § 49-324 permits the Idaho Transportation Department 
impose a greater penalty than authorized by Idaho statutes simply because the new 
conviction arose outside the State ofldaho? 
d. If permitted by statute, does the tremendous disparity in the 
treatment of an out-of-state first offense conviction violated Ms. Warner's constitutional 
rights to Equal Protection, Due Process and her Right to Travel as established by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Privilege and 
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution as well as the analogous protections 
of the Idaho State Constitution? 
11. A transcript of the Administrative Hearing held on October 28, 2014 is 
requested. 
12. By reason of the acts of the Respondent, it has been necessary for Ms. 
Warner to retain the services of an attorney. Ms. Warner has incurred and will continue 
to incur costs and attorney fees. Ms. Warner requests Respondent be ordered to pay her 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. Should the matter proceed by 
default, attorney's fees and costs incurred shall be Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.) Ms. 
Warner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs under I.C. § 12-117, I.R.C.P 
54( e) and any other applicable rule, statute or case law. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the following relief: 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 4 
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I. That the Court enter an order staying the suspension of the Petitioner's 
privileges and that the order provide that the Petitioner's driving privileges will 
remain in effect and valid until a decision is issued by this Court on the Petition for 
Judicial Review. 
2. That based upon the entire record in the case the Court find that the Idaho 
Transportation Department suspension of Petitioner's driving privileges for one year 
violates statutory provisions, is not supported by substantial evidence presented at the 
hearing, is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, and is in violation of Ms. 
Warner's federal and state constitutional rights. 
3. That this Court set aside the Order of the Hearing Examiner issue dated 
November 15, 2014, and that the matter be remanded to the Idaho Transportation 
Department with instructions to vacate the one year suspension and to impose no more 
than a 90 day suspension, with credit for the suspension already served. 
4. That this Court issue an order that the hearing examiner's order was in 
violation of LC. §§ 49-324, 18-8004, 18-8005 and 67-5270, et. seq. 
5. That this Court issue an order that the hearing officer acted without 
reasonable basis in fact or law in sustaining the one year suspension and the Order was 
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion and that the Order violated Ms. Warner's 
federal and state constitutional rights. 
6. That the Court award Ms. W amer her attorney fees and costs. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 5 
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That the Court issue an order such other and further relief as the Court 
deems just and equitable. 
Dated this 4l. day of December, 2014. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 6 
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VERIFICATION 
I, Andrew Parnes, being duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and state: I am the 
attorney for Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, in the above-entitled action; that service of the 
Petition has been made upon the Idaho Transportation Department pursuant to I.R.C.P 
S(f); that the Clerk of the administrative agency will be paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcript; that the Clerk of the administrative agency will be paid the 
estimated fee for the preparation of the record. ~ £---
fjl;parn~ 
Subscribed and sworn RsJ'~e me this/\ day of December, 2014. I'>.,,,.. 11,,,,. ..=:\... 
,$-'""' J AQJ< ... •11,, ~ ~~1',r' :.~ ,, §' :,,..~ ....... ,,,\\\\\\\11,,,, ,,~ ~· //' f ~o~"RJ, '\ % _k2f~ ~ -'::::i;! ,_ \o ~ . 
% \ ,; • CJ J :r: g No~ Publ\!f oc I\aho 
\ \,, p 'o"~.?~ f Res1dmg at l3:::1'i,! o :I[) 
\ \$';•,,,,"~"''''~ ~./" Commission Expiresc)b.£&o J.Dt'3 
,,,,,, ..ct,e o~ ,$" ... 
,,,, 1',,, 
"'"\\''""'" 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1hay of December, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method 
marked herein: 
Driver Services/ Administrative Hearing Section 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
3311 West State Street 
Boise, ID 83707 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Mailed 
--
c2':'<ax 208-332-4124 
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ANDREW PARNES 
Attorney at Law 
First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 726-1010 
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187 
Attorney for Defendant 
~ynn Drs!!Je, Clerk Dlstrlct 
'Otlrt Blaine Cou Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014- 7 ){,L{ 
ORDER STA YING LICENSE 
SUSPENSION AND SETTING 
SHOW CAUSE HEARJNG 
Upon the Filing of the Petition for Judicial Review and for good cause shown 
therein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the license suspension of Petitioner which began 
on October 9, 2014 is STAYED pending consideration of the Petition. 
An Show Cause Hearing on why this Stay shall not remain in effect is set for the 
/ )~ day of December, 2014, at the hour of q 301mbefore this Court. 
The Court Clerk shall serve this Order on Respondent, Department of 
ORDER STA YING LICENSE SUSPENSION ANTI 
SETTING SHOW CAUSE HEARJNG 1 
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Transportation, forthwith. 
Dated: / ).. \ '1\ \ ~ 
ct'. ~ ( (,(.,{) ~\1\JLS 
-r,-D ~-331..- c..1,1..'-} 
Robert~(y 
District Judge 
ORDER STA YING LICENSE SUSPENSION AND 
SETTING SHOW CAUSE HEARING 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\1TY OF BLAINE 
----------
j FILED ~:~9b.rolfJ 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner, 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-784 
J DEC - ml'! I 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JoLynn Drags, Cl6lt District 
Court Blalrie Cnuntv. Idaho 
~......--. . --
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
PROCEDURAL ORDER GOVERNING 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY 
ACTION BY DISTRICT COURT 
A Petition for Judicial Review has been filed in the above-entitled District Court 
seeking judicial review of state agency and local government actions. This Order, 
together with Rule 84, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, (lR.C.P.) and the applicable 
statutes shall govern all proceedings before this Court. 
1. Petition for Judicial Review or Cross-Petitions for Judicial Review; Filing 
Fees: The petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review was filed December 4, 2014 
A Cross-Petition for Judicial Review has not been filed. If not already paid, all judicial 
review filing fees, if any, must be paid within seven (7) days after filing of the Petition 
for Judicial Review or Cross-Petition for Judicial Review. Failure to timely pay any filing 
fee shall be grounds for dismissal without further notice. 
2. Stays: Unless provided by Statute, the filing of a Petition or Cross-Petition 
does not automatically stay the proceedings and enforcement of the action of an agency 
that is subject to the Petition. Any application or Motion for Stay must be made in 
accordance with lR.C.P. Rule 84(m). 
3. Form of Review: Pursuant to lR.C.P. 84(e)(l), when judicial review is 
authorized by statute, judicial review shall be based upon the record created before the 
agency rather than as a trial de novo, unless the statute or law provides for the procedure 
or standard. If the authorized statute provides the district court may take additional 
evidence upon judicial review, it may order the same on its own motion or the motion of 
any party. If the statute provides that review is de novo, the appeal shall be tried in the 
district court on any and all issues, on a new record. Pursuant to lR.C.P. Rule 84(e)(2), 
the scope of review on petition from an agency to the district court shall be as provided 
by statute. 
4. Preparation of Agency Record; Payment of Fees: Pursuant to lR. C.P. 
84(f), when the statute provides what shall be contained in the official record of the 
I 12 
agency upon judicial review, the agency shall prepare the record as provided by statute. 
Otherwise, the documents listed in paragraph (3) of LR.C.P. Rule 84(f) shall constitute 
the agency record for review. Petitioner shall pay all fees as required for preparation of 
the agency record in accordance with LR.C.P. Rule 84(e)(4). The clerk of the agency in 
accordance with lR.C.P. Rule 84(e)(5) shall lodge the record with the agency within 14 
days of the filing of the Petition for Judicial Review. Any extension sought for 
preparation of the agency record shall be made by the agency to the district court. 
5. Preparation of Transcript, Payment of Fee: The Court requires the 
provision of a written transcript prepared from the recorded or reported proceedings. It is 
the responsibility of the Petitioner (or Cross-Petitioner, as the case may be) to timely 
arrange and pay for preparation of all portions of the transcript reasonably necessary for 
review. Pursuant to lR.C.P. 84(g), the responsible party shall contact the agency clerk to 
determine the estimated cost of the transcript, and pay the estimated cost in accordance 
with I.R.C.P. 84(g)(l)(A) or (2)(A) as the case may be. The transcript shall be lodged 
with the agency within 14 days of the filing of the petition for judicial review in 
accordance with l.R.C.P. 84(g)(l)(B), (C) or 84(g)(2)(B)(C) as the case may be. The 
transcriber may apply to the district court for an extension of time, for good cause shown. 
6. Settlement of Transcript and Record. Pursuant to IR. C.P. 84G), and unless 
otherwise provided by statute, upon receipt of the transcript and upon completion of the 
record, the agency shall mail or deliver Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Record to all 
attorneys of record or parties appearing in person and to the district court. The parties 
shall have 14 days from the date of mailing of the notice to pick up a copy of the 
transcript and agency record and to object to the transcript or record. All fees for the 
preparation of the transcript and record shall be paid by the responsible party at or before 
the pick up of the agency record and transcript. Any objection to the record shall be 
determined by the agency within 14 days of receipt of the objection and the agency 
decision on the objection shall be included in the record on petition for review. Upon the 
failure of the party to object within 14 days, the transcript and record shall be deemed 
settled. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(k), the settled record and transcript shall be lodged with 
the district court within 42 days of the service of the Petition for Judicial Review. 
7. Augmentation of Record-Additional Evidence Presented to District 
Court- Remand to Agency to Take Additional Evidence: Pursuant to LR.C.P. 84(1) 
the agency record and/or transcript on review may be augmented upon motion by a party 
within 21 days of the filing of the settled transcript and record in the manner prescribed 
by LA.R. 30. The taking of additional evidence by the district court and/or agency on 
remand shall be governed by statute or LR.C.P. 84(1). 
8. Briefs: The petitioner's brief shall be filed with the clerk within 35 days 
after lodging of the transcript and record. The respondent's brief (cross-petitioner's brief) 
shall be filed within 28 days after service of petitioner's brief. The petitioner may file a 
reply brief within 21 days after service of respondent's brief. The organization and 
content of briefs shall be governed by LA.R. 35 and 36. Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 84(p) only 
one (1) original signed brief may be filed with the court; however, an additional copy of 
2 13 
any brief will be plainly marked "Judge's copy" and will be provided for use by the 
court, mailed or delivered to the judge in chambers. Copies of all briefs shall be served 
on all parties. 
9. Extensions of Time: Motions to extend the time for filing a brief shall be 
submitted in conformity with LA.R. 34(e). All other requests for extension of time shall 
be submitted in conformity with I.A.R. 46. 
10. Motions: All motions shall be submitted in conformity with LR. C.P. 84( o) 
and shall be heard with out oral argument unless ordered by the Court. 
11. Oral Argument: After all briefs have been filed, either party may set the 
matter for oral argument pursuant to LR.C.P. 84(q). If neither party notices the matter for 
oral argument within 14 days of the filing of the last brief ( or the time for filing briefs has 
expired) the Court will deem oral argument waived and the matter will be decided on the 
record, transcript and briefs. If the matter is set for oral argument, the form and order of 
argument shall be governed by LA.R. 37. It is the responsibility of both counsel to set the 
case for oral argument or notify the Court in writing that argument has been waived. 
12. Judgment or Decision. The Court's decision will be by written 
memorandum which shall constitute the Judgment or Decision required by I.R. C.P. 
84(t)(l). 
13. Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal: Costs and attorneys fees on judicial 
review shall be claimed, objected to and fixed in accordance with I.A.R. 40 and 41, 
provided that only one original signed claim, objection or supporting or opposing 
affidavit need be filed. 
14. Remittitur: If no notice of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court is filed within 
forty-two (42) days after filing of the Court's written decision, the clerk shall issue a 
remittitur remanding the matter to the agency as provided in I.R. C.P. 84(t)( 4). 
15. Failure to Comply: Failure by either party to timely comply with the 
requirement of this Order or provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or Idaho 
Appellate Rules, if applicable, shall be grounds for imposition of sanctions, including, but 
not limited to the allowance of attorneys fees, striking of briefs or dismissal of the appeal 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 and 84(n) and I.A.R. 11.1 and 21. 
DA TED this _!/_ day of /ku.mt)U"' , 20 _!$ 
~dge 
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I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the _5_ day of ffi__. , 20 J;f., I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Andrew Parnes 
PO Box 5988 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Idaho Transportation Department 
PO Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83 707 
(~U.S. Mail 
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( ) Court Folder 
()(5 U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( ) Court Folder 
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State of Idaho 
Timothy J. Stover 
LC 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248 
Telephone: (208) 736-9900 
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929 
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OEC 1 0 2014 
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Court Blaine Coun , l@=sho.....--
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 2014-784 
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO 
ORDER STAYING LICENSE 
SUSPENSION 
COMES NOW, Timothy J. Stover, attorney for Respondent, State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation, and hereby notifies the Court of its non-objection to the Order Staying License 
Suspension and Setting Show Cause Hearing entered by this Court on December 4, 2014 
pursuant to the Petitioner, Susan Jane Wainer, filing her Petition for Judicial Review. 
Further, pursuant to this Notice of Non-Objection, Respondent requests that this Court 
cancel the Show Cause Hearing on why this Stay shall not remain in effect which is presently 
scheduled to be heard on December 15, 2014. 
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO ORDER ST A YING LICENSES SUSPENSION • l 
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this day December. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies th.at on the IO'h day of December, 2014, he caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following 
maru1er: 
Andrew Parnes 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
i ) Overnight Mail 
(9Q. Facsimile 
(.208) 726-11 -----
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO ORDER ST A YING LICENSES SUSPENSION - 2 
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LAW OFFICES 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER. 
HARWOOD & HIGH, L.L.P. 
126 Second Avenue North 
P.O. Box366 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366 
Telephone (208) 733-5463 
Facsimile No. (208) 734-1438 
FACSIMILE 
TO: Clerk - District Court 
COMP ANY: Blaine County Courthouse 
FAX#: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
(208) 788-5527 
Bren E. Mollerup 
December 10, 2014 
'7:·4 i .. ' 
RE: Swindley v. Lynn & Bontrager-Case No. CV-13-664 
NU.MBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET): 3 
;/'\ 
1J F. 00 l 
NOTE: Please contact our office immediately in the event you fail to receive the designated 
number of pages or have a problem with the transmission. 
MESSAGE: Attached is the signed Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice. Please fax file 
the same. 
I am placing in the mail tonight copies of the Stipulation and Order to be court 
stamped and copies returned to counsel, along with self-addressed, 
stamped envelopes. 
Please vacate the Pretrial Hearing that is scheduled for Monday, December 
15th at 1 :30 p.m. 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE 
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FACSIMILE IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OR ATIORNEY WORK 
PRODUCT OR. BOTH AND IS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT LISTED ABOVE ANY 
READING, DISCLOSURE, USE OR REPRODUCTION OF THIS COMMUNICATION OTHER THAN BY THE INTENDED 
RECIPIENT IS PROHIBITED. lF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION JN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY US 
BY COLLECT TELEPHONE CALL IMMEDIATELY AND RETURN THE COMMUNICATION TO US VIA U.S. MAIL. 
Original Document will: 
follow by regular mail 
follow by express mail 
not be sent 
(16202\Clerk Fax) 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attomey General 
DEC 1 O 2014 
State of Idaho 
Timothy J. Stover 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248 
Telephone: (208) 736~9900 
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929 
ISB #4842 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner. 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 2014-784 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
COMES NOW, Timothy J. Stover, and hereby enters his appearance as counsel of record 
for Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Transportation. A true and correct copy of his 
appointment as Special Deputy Prosecuting Attorney General is attached. Please serve all pleadings 
and papers in this matter to Timothy J. Stover. P.O. Box 1428, Twin Falls, Idaho 833u..-·,-..L:. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE • l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 101h day of December, 2014, he caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following 
manner: 
Ar1dtew Patnes 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
~ } Overnight Mail \X: Facsimile 
(208) 726-1187 
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December 4, 2013 
Timothy J. Stover 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 5226 
Twin Falls, ID 83303~5226 
Re: Special Deputy Attorney General Appointment - Automatic License 
Suspension (ALS) Program 
Dear Mr. Stover: 
I enclose your renewal appointment as Special Deputy Attorney General for the purpose 
of representing the State of Idaho in any appeal from a hearing officer's decision in 
Idaho Transportation Department· District 4 filed pursuant to the authority of Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A; Automatic License Suspension Program. Please include the appointment 
when you appear as attorney of record in any such appeal. 
It is our understanding that you have reached an agreement with the Idaho 
Transportation Department regarding the payment of your costs and fees incurred in the 
representation of the state in these matters. 
This appointment will expire on December 31, 2014, or at such earlier date as 
determined by this office. 
Sincerely, 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
LGW:blm 
Enc. 
c: -~: Brian w. Ness} ldaho-Transportation Department 
. :.; : . :Larfy AUen; · 1dah6 Transportatioh.Oepartment 
! ~ .! • ' ' . 
P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720·0010 
Tafapnone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 854-0071 
L.oGated at 700 w. Jllfterson Street, Suite 210 21 
Beth Schiller 
Administrative Assistant, 
Idaho Transportation Department 
11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8755 
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002 
FILED ~·i--
DEC 1 7 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Susan Jane Warner, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2014-784 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
OF AGENCY RECORD 
Beth Schiller, Administrative Assistant of the Idaho Transportation Department, hereby 
gives notice pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84U) of lodging of the agency record in the above-captioned 
matter. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the mailing of this notice in 
which to file with the agency any objections. If no objections to the record are filed with the 
agency within fourteen (14) days, the record shall be deemed settled. Parties may pick up a copy 
of the record between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. at the Idaho Transportation 
Department, 3311 West State Street, Boise, Idaho 83703. 
The Agency Record consists of the following documents: 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 1 
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Description 
Conviction Record from Madison County Justice Court Montana 
Notice of Suspension 
Page Number 
1 
Request for Hearing 
Copy of Petitioner's Driver's License Record 
Notice of Telephone Hearing 
Miscellaneous Correspondence and Documents 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order 
Motion for Reconsideration 
Order on Motion for Reconsideration 
Petition for Judicial Review 
Order to Stay License Suspension 
Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review 
Transcription Estimate Request 
2-4 
5-7 
8-11 
12 
13~18 
19-23 
24-34 
35-36 
37-44 
45-47 
48-51 
52 
As of this DATE, December 15, 2014, a Transcript has [ x ], has not [ ] been requested 
by the petitioner or his attorney. 
DATED this 15th day of December, 2014. 
4'e&i.-~ 
/ 
· Beth Schiller 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby that on this 15th day of December, 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
ANDREW PARNES 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 5988 
KETCHUM, ID 83340 
TIMOTHY STOVER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 3 
_x_u.s. MAIL 
_HAND DELIVERED 
__ OVEKt\HGHT MAIL 
_TELECOPY (FAX) 
-1.l_ELECTRONIC MAIL 
_HAND DELIVERED 
_OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_TELECOPY (FAX) 
4.~>~ 
Beth Schiller 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Timothy J. Stover 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box i428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248 
Telephone: (208) 736-9900 
Facsimile; (208) 736-9929 
!SB #4842 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
* * * * * 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner, Case No. CV 2014-784 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE OF COURT REPORTER'S 
ESTIMATE 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, by and through its 
counsel of record, Timothy J. Stover, Special Deputy Attorney General, and pursuant to IRCP 
84(g), provides Notice of Court Reporter's Estimate. Pursuant to Exhibit "A" attached hereto, 
Petitioner's estimated cost for preparation of the transcript is $75.00. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2014. ~1 
~0tliy J. Stove~-
,._..,,.,, 
,/ 
NOTICE OF COURT REPORTER'S ESTIMATE - I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 23rd day of December) 2014, he caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following 
manner: 
Andrew Parnes 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
NOT[CE OF COURT REPORTER'S ESTIMATE· 2 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
(208) 726-1187 
/~-----7 
,/7 // 
,/~/·( ~/ 
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December 20, 2014 
HEDRICK 
C OURT REPORTING 
'!'IMOTHYUJ. STOVER, ESQ. 
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
RE: Susan Jane Warner, DL#: ZA127717K File#: MT TK1400262 
0/S DUI Suspension, Date of Hearing: October 28. 2014 
Dear Mr. Stover: 
Per the request of Amy Kearns, Driver Records Program 
Specialist, we are hereby providing you with an 
estimate of the transcription costs in the above 
entitled matter. 
Cost of preparing an original plus two copies from the 
compact disc provided by the state, with an estimated 
length of 8 minutes is: 
$75.00 
Delivery time is 10 working days from the date that we 
receive written authority to proceed from Petitioner's 
legal counsel. Petitioner's payment .must be received 
prior to delivery of the transcript. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Amy Kearns 
g_., tu. ~f ca-irM'@~.fi~ mlJ 
POST OFFICE BOX 578 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
208-336-9208 EXHIBIT 
A 
Beth Schiller 
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services 
Idaho Transportation Department 
3311 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8637 
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Susan Jane Warner, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
State ofldaho, 
Department of Transportation 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014-784 
NOTICE OF FILING 
AGENCY RECORD 
Pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 84(k), the attached agency record in the above entitled matter is now 
deemed settled and is hereby filed. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2014. 
~--~kl-
1Beth Schill:r 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of December. 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
ANDREW PARNES 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 5988 
KETCHUM, ID 83340 
TIMOTHY STOVER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
_x_u.s. MAIL 
_HAND DELIVERED 
_OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_TELECOPY (FAX) 
-X_ELECTRONIC MAIL 
_HAND DELIVERED 
_OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_TELECOPY (FAX) 
Pages 1-52 of the Agency Record were emailed to Mr. Parnes on 12/18/14. Page 53 of 
the Agency Record was mailed to Mr. Parnes' office on 12/30/14. 
/5~~,iA ~ ~ 
Beth Schiller 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - 2 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Timothy J. Stover 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box i428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248 
Telephone: (208) 736-9900 
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929 
ISB #4842 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 2014-784 
NOTICE OF FILING 
TRANSCRIPT 
COMES NOW, the Respondent, STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, by and through its counsel of record, Special Deputy Attorney General 
TIMOTHY J. STOVER and pursuant to IRCP 84(g) and 84(j), provides the Court with the original 
transcript of the Administrative License Suspension Hearing for the Idaho Department of 
Transportation in the Matter of SUSAN JANE WARNER, File No. MT TKl 400262, held October 
28, 2014, before hearing officer Michael Howell of the Idaho Department of Transportation. 
By this Notice of Filing of Transcript, the undersigned hereby provides notice that a copy of 
said Tra..nscript has been retained by the undersigned with an additional copy beh,g mailed to 
counsel for Petitioner with this Notice of Filing of Transcript. Notice is also provided that any 
NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT - l 
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objections to the Transcript shall be filed within fourteen days from the date of mailing of this 
Notice of Filing of Transcript with the Idaho Department Transportation. Failure to file an 
objection within said fourteen (14) days shall result in the Transcript being deemed settled. Any 
objection made to the Transcript shall be determined by the Idaho Department of Transportation 
within fourteen (14) days of receipt thereof. The Idaho Department of Transportation's decision on 
the objection and all evidence, e:id1ibits, and written presentations on the objection shall be included 
in the record on petition for review. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 15th day of January, 2015, he caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
Andrew Parnes 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
NOTlCE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT - 2 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(208) 726-1187 
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Beth Schiller 
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services 
Idaho Transportation Department 
3311 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8637 
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002 
FEB 2 4 20f5 
J,."!!nn Drage, Clerk District 
'-NUrt Blaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Susan Jane Warner, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2014-784 
AMENDED NOTICE OF FILING 
AGENCY RECORD 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(k), the attached agency record in the above entitled matter is now 
deemed settled and is hereby filed. 
DA TED this 20th day of February, 2015. 
~~ 
., . 7 
Beth Schiller 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - l 
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CERTIF1CA1E OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 20th day of February, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
ANDREW PARNES 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 5988 
KETCHUM, ID 83340 
TIMOTHY STOVER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
_x_u.s. MAIL 
_HAND DELIVERED 
_OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_1ELECOPY (FAX) 
_K_ELECTRONIC MAIL 
_HAND DELIVERED 
_OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_1ELECOPY (FAX) 
Copies of pages 1-59 of the Amended Agency Record were emailed to Mr. Parnes on 
2/20/15. 
~~~ 
' Beth Schiller 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - 2 
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
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) 
Case No. CV-2014-784 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
ANDREW PARNES 
Attorney at Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: 208-726-10 I 0 
Facsimile: 208-726-1187 
Attorney for Petitioner 
TIMOTHY J. STOVER 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248 
Telephone: 208-736-9900 
Facsimile: 208-736-9929 
Attorney for Respondent 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, filed a petition for judicial review a State of 
Idaho, Department of Transportation decision, affirming a one year absolute driving 
suspension pursuant to LC. § 49-324. 
On October 31, 2014, the hearing officer entered Findings ofFact and Conclusions 
of Law and Preliminary Order. (Agency Record, hereinafter "AR," 25-29.) Ms. Warner 
filed a timely petition for reconsideration on November 7, 2014. (AR 30-40.) 
On November 15, 2014, the hearing officer denied the petition for reconsideration 
and entered an order sustaining the one year absolute driving license suspension. (AR 41-
42.) This Petition for Judicial Review was timely filed on December 4, 2014. (AR 43.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Warner was sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence charge in 
the State of Montana on September 16, 2016. She was convicted of a violation of MCA 
§ 61-8-465(1)(a), driving with a blood alcohol in excess of .16, specifically a .176. (AR 
21.) 
After receiving notice of the conviction from the State of Montana, the Idaho 
Transportation Department (hereinafter "Department") sent Ms. Warner was notification 
of a one year absolute suspension of her Idaho driving privileges effective on October 9, 
2014. (AR 2-3.) 
1 
38 
The order of suspension was unclear on whether this suspension was based upon 
Idaho aggravated driving under the influence or because Ms. Warner had a prior 
conviction for driving under the influence within the past ten years in the State of Idaho. 
However, the hearing officer's decision concluded that the one year license suspension 
was valid because Ms. Warner had suffered a prior conviction for a DUI within the State 
of Idaho and the Montana conviction was thus her second offense within a ten year 
period. (AR 41.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the State of Idaho have the authority to suspend a person's driving 
privileges for a conviction of first offense driving under the influence charge from 
another state when a similar conviction in the State of Idaho would only permit a 90 day 
license suspension, even if the driver had a prior DUI conviction within the preceding ten 
years? 
2. Whether LC.§ 18-8005(4)(e) can apply to an out-of-state conviction for a 
first offense driving under the influence charge when it does not apply to a person so 
convicted in the State of Idaho? 
3. Whether I.C. § 49-324 permits the Idaho Transportation Department to 
impose a greater penalty than authorized by Idaho statutes simply because the new 
conviction arose outside the State of Idaho? 
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4. Even if permitted by statute, does the disparate treatment of an out-of-state 
offense conviction violate Ms. Warner's constitutional rights to Equal Protection, 
Due Process and her Right to Travel as established by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Privilege and Immunities Clause 
of the United States Constitution as well as the analogous protections of the Idaho State 
Constitution? 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-117 and I.R.C.P., Rule 54(e), Ms. Warner is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees and costs should she prevail in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Ms. Warner's Montana Conviction was not for a Second Offense 
Ms. Warner was originally charged in Montana by complaint with a second 
offense DUI. (AR 38.) During the court proceedings, an amended complaint was filed 
alleging only that she drove a vehicle with more than a .16, in violation of MCA§ 61-8-
465(l)(a), which is separate and distinct from the statute controlling a second offense 
- DUI in Montana. (AR 22.) She subsequently pied guilty to this amended charge and the 
Judgment itself demonstrates that this was not a conviction for a second offense in 
Montana. (AR 1, 21.) Ms. Warner was sentenced as a first time offender. 
Thereafter, Ms. Warner was notified that pursuant to I.C. § 49-324 her license 
would be suspended in Idaho. Section 49-324 reads: 
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The department shall suspend, disqualify or revoke the driver's license or 
privilege of any resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to 
operate a motor vehicle in this state upon receiving notice of the conviction, 
administrative action or court order of that person in another state or 
jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this state, would be 
grounds for the suspension, disqualification or revocation of the driver's 
license and privileges of the driver. The department shall forward a 
certified copy or electronic transfer to the national driver register. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No matter how many prior convictions a person may have had within the previous 
ten years, if that person is sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence 
conviction, the license suspension under Idaho law is for a thirty-day absolute suspension, 
followed by sixty days of restricted driving privileges. I.C. § 18-8005( 1 )( d). Therefore, 
under section 49-324, Ms Warner's license can be suspended only for the period set forth 
in section 18-8005(1)(d) and the Department erred in suspending her privileges for a 
greater period than if the crime had been committed in Idaho. On this ground alone, the 
Department's decision must be reduced to the length of suspension permitted for a first 
offense violation in Idaho. 
2. I.C. § 18-8005( 4 )( e) Does not Apply 
In rejecting Ms. Warner's objections, the hearing officer concluded that the 
Department had the power to apply the suspension for a second offense DUI solely 
because Ms. Warner's conviction occurred within ten years of a prior conviction. (AR 
41.) 
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There is no question that a person who is convicted of a second offense DUI 
within Idaho shall have her privileges suspended for one year, with no restricted permit. 
See, I.C. § 18-8005( 4 )( e) ["Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an 
additional mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from confinement, 
during which one (I) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be 
granted."]. But Ms. Warner was not convicted of a second offense DUI in Montana. 1 
The Department cites no statute or case law permitting the Department to impose a 
sentence greater than the maximum suspension for the offense committed by the driver. 
The Department does not dispute the fact that throughout Idaho many defendants are 
convicted of a first offense DUI despite the fact that they had prior convictions for the 
same offense within the prior ten year period. Once a defendant is convicted in an Idaho 
court of a first offense DUI, the Department has no authority to suspend the license for 
longer than the maximum imposed by statute and pronounced in the court judgment. To 
permit otherwise would impose sentences greater than the maximum permitted by Idaho 
law and would deny defendants the benefits of their bargains in the criminal courts. 
Therefore, since Ms. Warner was not convicted under a statute with penalties 
similar to LC. § 18-8005( 4 )( e ), her one year suspension must be set aside. 
1Had the complaint not been amended and had her Montana conviction been for a 
second offense, she would not have grounds to challenge the one year suspension. 
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-3. The Fact of the Out-of-State Conviction Does not Authorize 
a One Year License Suspension 
The Department's position appears to be that it can disregard the nature of the 
conviction and impose a greater suspension solely because the conviction occurred in 
another state. This argument must be rejected. 
Section 49-324 permits a suspension for a foreign conviction only if the act 
committed in Idaho would be grounds for a license suspension. The purpose behind the 
statute is straightforward - no one should avoid a license suspension from her own state 
simply because the violation occurred in another jurisdiction. Similarly, the legislature 
did not give the Department authority to impose a greater suspension solely because the 
illegal activity occurred in a foreign jurisdiction. In fact, the purpose of the notice 
provisions of the interstate compact is to assure the a person's home state is made aware 
of any driving violations committed outside the State. 
Ms. W amer is not asking that her conviction in Montana have no repercussion for 
her in Idaho; she simply asks that she not be punished more than if the crime had been 
committed within Idaho, and the statute permits no more. Here, the Department has 
chosen to disregard the nature of the Montana conviction and impose a greater 
suspension. There is no basis for this action and the one year license suspension must be 
set aside. 
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4. The Department's Application of the Statute also Violates Ms. Warner's 
Constitutional Rights 
If this Court holds that the Department has the authority to impose a greater license 
suspension solely because this conviction occurred out of Idaho, such an interpretation 
violates Ms. Warner's federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection of the 
law, her right to travel and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
the Privilege and Immunities Clause to the United States Constitution and the Idaho State 
Constitution. 
Ms. Warner is being singled out for the additional suspension solely because her 
conviction was in Montana, not Idaho. There is no rational basis for the State, through 
the Transportation Department, to impose a greater suspension than permitted had the 
conviction been within the State. The entire goal of the interstate compact is to assure 
that drivers as a class, whether they drive within or without the state, are treated equally 
under the laws of the State ofldaho. Because Ms. Warner is being singled out from other 
drivers, her suspension must be set aside. 
When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict scrutiny applies to 
fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate scrutiny applies to 
classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; and rational basis scrutiny 
applies to all other challenges. For analyses made under the Idaho 
Constitution, slightly different levels of scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as 
under federal law, applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes. 
Means-focus scrutiny, unlike federal intermediate scrutiny, is employed 
"where the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory classification 
is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of lack of 
relationship between the classification and the declared purpose of the 
statute." Rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges. 
7 
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v, Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 830, 25 
751, 754, 9 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2000). 
850 (2001 ), citing State v. Mowry, 34 Idaho 
Under the rational basis standard, the court must determine if the challenged 
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See, Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996). 
In addition, imposing this greater suspension violates Ms. Warner's right to travel 
in other states. "Freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized 
as a basic right under the Constitution." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 
(1966). "[A]ny classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless 
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is 
unconstitutional." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969). 
If a person can receive penalties from Idaho, greater than that permitted for driving 
within the State, her right to travel to other parts of the United States is impinged upon. 
In this case, the State of Montana imposed its sentence for a first offense DUI conviction. 
Idaho law permits the Department to impose a suspension because she is an Idaho 
licensed driver. But merely because she decided to travel out of state and was convicted 
of a first offense DUI when doing so, Idaho's imposition of a greater suspension greater 
impinges on Ms. Warner's right to travel without the State having a compelling interest in 
- doing so. 
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-Because LC. §18-8005(4)(e) requires a finding by a court on proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or a guilty plea to the elements of a second offense DUI to permit the 
Department to impose a one year suspension, this code section cannot be used by the 
Department without identical proof that Ms. Warner was convicted in Montana of a 
second offense DUI, in order to impose an administrative suspension in excess of a first 
offense DUL Because there was no court finding that this was a second offense, the 
Department imposed suspension violates Ms. Warner's rights and must be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must set aside the one-year license 
suspension imposed by the Department and order that the Department may only impose a 
license suspension for a first offense DUI if committed within the State of Idaho, with 
credit for the time before Ms. Warner's license suspension was stayed. 
Dated this J't1' day of February, 2015. 
/JU--~ ~ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Case No. CV 2014-784 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Respondent, the State of Idaho Department of Transportation 
("Department"), by and through its counsel of record, Special Deputy Attorney General Timothy J. 
Stover and, hereby submits the following memorandum of law and argument. 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case began with the filing of a Petition for Judicial Review ("Petition") in the District 
Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Blaine ("District 
Court"). The Petition, filed by Petitioner Susan Jane Warner. ("Warner"), requests review of a decision 
from the Department, by and through its Hearing Officer, Michael B. Howell ("Hearing Officer"). The 
administrative decision in question sustained the Notice of Suspension ("Notice"). 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On September 23, 2014, the Department issued the Notice, suspending Warner's license forone 
year. Id. at 2-4. Warner requested a hearing on October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A hearing was held on October 
16, 2014. Id. at 25. The Hearing Officer upheld the suspension on October 31, 2014. Id. at 27. 
Thereafter, Warner submitted a Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The Hearing Officer denied 
Warner's petition on November 15, 2014. Id. at 41. Warner filed this Petition on December 4, 2014. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On July 9, 2012, Warner was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI") in Idaho. R. 25; 
See R. 9, 36. On April 5, 2014, Warner was involved in a single-car accident in Montana. Id. at 35-36. 
It appeared that Warner had veered off the highway, hit a concrete barrier, and then ended up back on 
the highway. Id. Warner was detained and given a breath test, which produced a blood alcohol content 
("BAC") of .179. Id. After being transported to the Madison Valley Medical Center for evaluation 
following her crash, Warner consented to a blood draw. Id. Her blood draw later revealed a BAC of 
.176. Id. Warner was cited for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol-2nd offense, in violation of 
Montana Code Annotated ("MCA")§ 6I-8-401(1)(a). ld. 
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On July the State of Montana amended the charge against Warner to Aggravated DUI, 
violation of MCA§ -8-465(l)(a). Id. at On September 16, Warner pied guilty to the 
Aggravated DUI charge. Id. at 21. On or about September 22, 2014, the Idaho Transportation 
Department (the "Department") received notice of Warner's Montana Aggravated DUI conviction. Id. 
at 1. On September 23, 2014, the Department issued a Notice of Suspension ("Notice"), suspending 
Warner's license for one year. Id. at 2-4. Warner requested a hearing on October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A 
hearing was held on October 16, 2014. Id. at 25. At the Hearing, Warner argued that "the aggravated 
DUI in - - Montana is a different statute than aggravated DUI in Idaho." Tr. 2-3. Warner continued 
arguing that because the enhanced DUI in Idaho required a BAC of .20, the enhanced DUI in Montana 
only required a .16, and Warner's BAC was approximately .17, the enhanced DUI could not serve as a 
basis for her year-long suspension in Idaho. Id. Warner also argued "in order for it to be a year 
suspension under Idaho, the Court has to - - it has to be a conviction for a second offense DUI, not a - -
not just a happens to be a second offense." Id. at 4. The Hearing Officer upheld the suspension on 
October 31, 2014. R. 27. Thereafter, Warner submitted a Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The 
Hearing Officer denied Warner's petition on November 15, 2014. Id. at 41. Warner filed her Petition 
for Judicial Review on December 4, 2014. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of department 
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. See Idaho 
Code§§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270; See also, In re Suspension of Driver's License of 
Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 941, 155 P.3d 1176, 1180 (Ct. App. 2006). An administrative driver's 
license suspension "is a civil penalty separate and apart from any other suspension imposed for a 
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violation of other Idaho motor vehicle codes or for a conviction of an offense." In re Bowman, 1 
868 ). A court may overturn an agency's decision only 
when the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or 
constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful 
procedure; ( d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion. Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd of County Comm 'rs, 
131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); See also, In re Marshall, 137 Idaho 337,340, 48 P.3d 
666,669 (Ct. App. 2002); In re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 44,304 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Ct. App. 2013). 
V. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
The Department was required to suspend W amer' s license for one year. W amer is attempting to 
exploit the differences between Idaho DUI laws and Montana DUI laws to evade the obvious 
conclusion that had W amer committed the Montana DUI in Idaho, her license would be suspended for 
one year. W amer does not dispute the Agency's authority to suspend her license, rather W amer contests 
the appropriate duration of that suspension. 
A. Interpreting the Department's authority. 
Two Idaho Code sections provide the Department with the authority to suspend Warner's 
license. First, Idaho Code§ 49-324 states that the Department 
shall suspend, disqualify or revoke the driver's license or privilege of any resident of 
this state or the privilege of a nonresident to operate a motor vehicle in this state upon 
receiving notice of the conviction, administrative action, or court order of that person in 
another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this state, would be 
grounds for the suspension, disqualification or revocation of the driver's iicense and 
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privileges the driver. The department shall forward a certified copy or electronic 
transfer to the national driver register. 
Similarly, Idaho Code§ 49-326(l)(e) states that the Department 
is authorized to suspend, disqualify or revoke the license or privileges of a driver 
without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence 
that the driver: ... [h]as committed an offense in another state or jurisdiction as 
evidenced by a conviction, court order or administrative action, which if committed in 
Idaho would be grounds for suspension, disqualification or revocation ... 
Warner interprets these statutes such that the Department can only consider the form of the 
conviction, and not the facts underlying the conviction, in determining the appropriate suspension 
length. Warner's narrow interpretation of these statutes is contradicted by the language and purpose of 
the statutes. 
Warner's interpretation is not consistent with the language of the statutes. "The plain 
meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless 
plain meaning leads to absurd results." Bowman, 135 Idaho at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. Idaho Code§§ 
49-324 and 49-326 focus on the "offenses" "committed." "Commit" is defined as, "to perpetrate (a 
crime)." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). "Perpetrate" is defined as "to commit or carry out 
(an act, esp. a crime)." Id. "Offense is defined as "a violation of the law." Id. In focusing on the 
offense committed, the legislature intended that the Department look at the underlying acts of the 
law violation, not the form of the conviction especially considering a person may commit an act, 
but a person cannot commit a conviction. See Idaho Code§ 49-324 ("if committed in this state, 
would be grounds for ... "). 
Additionally, a second DUI is not a separate and distinct offense than a first DUI. Both are a 
DUI offenses and the number of previous DUis only affects the enhancement of the penalties in 
criminal cases. In State v. Schall, Idaho 488, _, 337 P.3d 647,651 (2014), the Supreme Court 
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addressed whether I 8-8005(6) (third or subsequent DUI) constituted a separate and distinct offense 
or consisted of enhancement provisions. The looked at section "Penalties," and 18-
8005(8), which characterizes subsections 4, 6, and 9 as "enhancement[s]," and determined, along 
with other reasons, that the provision for third or subsequent DUI was an enhancement provision 
and not a separate and distinct offense. Id. at 651-52. The Court made clear ''that in a prosecution 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8005( 6) [ for a third or subsequent DUI] the offense at issue is 
the violation ofldaho Code section 18-8004 [DUI] and that very offense may be charged either as a 
misdemeanor or a felony depending upon the defendant's prior criminal history." Id. at 652. 
Therefore, the DUI is the offense and whether it is a first, second, or third DUI does not constitute 
different offenses but only affects the sentencing in criminal cases. 
The legislature intended that the Department focus on the offense-the DUI-and not the 
sentencing enhancements from the foreign jurisdiction. This is made clear by the emphasis on 
"offense" "committed" in the statutes, as opposed to the "sentences imposed" or the "form of the 
judgment." Additionally, other portions of the statutes support this view of focusing on the act, or 
offense, rather than the sentence or form of judgment. As the statutes read, any administrative 
action or court order evidencing the offense committed is sufficient for suspending a person's 
license in Idaho. For example, if a foreign jurisdiction had the same statutes as Idaho and a driver 
had his or her license suspended by an agency similar to the Department, that suspension would 
serve as sufficient evidence to take action against the driver under Idaho Code§§ 49-324 and 49-
326--regardless of whether a conviction existed or the form of the conviction. Therefore, the 
legislature intended that the Department focus on the offense-the DUI-and not the form of the 
conviction when suspending driver's licenses in Idaho. 
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Finally, interpretation is contrary to the purpose of the administrative suspension 
statutes. "When a statute, [the courts are to] construe statute as a whole to give 
effect to the legislative intent." Bowman, 135 Idaho at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. The purpose of the 
administrative license suspension statutes is "to provide maximum safety for all persons using the 
highways of this state by quickly revoking the driving privileges of those persons" who drive under 
the influence. Id. at 846, 25 P.3d at 869. Idaho laws dictate that when a person commits more than 
one DUI within a certain period of time, that person's driving privileges will be suspended for a 
period of one year to protect the public. See Idaho Code§§ 18-8002A(2)(d) and 18-8005(4). One 
could imagine the confusion that would ensue and how the purpose of these statutes would be 
frustrated if the Department was limited to the form of a foreign conviction, not the offense or acts, 
given that each state has differing versions of DUI laws and punishment enhancements. 
Interpretations that provide drivers a "free bite," such as the one Warner proposes, are 
contrary to the purpose of the statutes. In Bowman, a driver was arrested for a DUI and submitted a 
blood test. Id. at 844, 25 P.3d at 867. Approximately one month later, before the blood test results 
were received, the driver was again arrested for a DUI but this time provided a breath test. Id. 
Having failed the breath test, the Department suspended his driver's license for ninety days. Id. 
When the blood test results were completed, showing that the driver's BAC from the first arrest 
was .19, the Department issued a notice that the driver's suspension would be for one year. Id. After 
the driver unsuccessfully challenged the notice at a hearing, the district court reversed the one-year 
suspension and implemented a ninety-day suspension. Id. The Department appealed. Id. 
The issue on appeal was the interpretation of the phrase, "failure of evidentiary testing." Id. 
at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. Tne Court found that ;'evidentiary testing refers to the completed series of 
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procedures" to determine the BAC and therefore the driver had not failed the evidentiary testing 
the testing was completed. at 846, P.3d at 869. interpreting the statute, the Court 
stated, "Both test results indicated that Bowman had been driving on two separate occasions while 
his blood-alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit" and that the driver's one-year license 
suspension was proper, reversing the district court. Id. After ruling, the Court noted that its 
interpretation of the statute "complies with the legislative purpose underlying the administrative 
license suspension statute ... [ which is] to provide maximum safety for all person using the 
highways" by revoking the licenses of intoxicated drivers. Id. The Court commented that the 
driver's interpretation of the statute "would allow a person to avoid a one-year suspension although 
alcohol concentration tests indicate that the person was driving under the influence on two separate 
occasions within a five-year period." Id. at 847, 25 P.3d at 870. The Court stated that such a "free 
bite" "would contradict the legislative purpose underlying" the administrative license suspensions. 
Id. 
The purpose of the requirement of a conviction, administrative decision, or court order from 
a foreign jurisdiction is so that the Department's decision to suspend a driver's license is to ensure 
that the decision is supported by reliable evidence, not to base the suspension off how the foreign 
jurisdiction charged and convicted the driver. The purpose of the statutes is effectuated when the 
facts underlying the conviction, which constitutes the offense, are used in the suspension, and not 
the form of the conviction. Warner's interpretation would permit a "free bite" and contradict the 
legislative purposes of the statutes. 
Warner's acts mandate a one year license suspension. Warner drove under the influence in 
Montana. Warner previously drove under the influence in 2012. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-
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8005(4), Warner would be subject, had she committed the offense in Idaho, to a one-year license 
suspension. 
B. Warner seeks a reduced license suspension because the offense was committed in 
Montana. 
While Warner argues that imposing a one-year license suspension for the Montana DUI would 
subject Warner to a harsher penalty than had she committed the act in Idaho, the opposite is true-
Warner is seeking a reduced consequence because the offense was committed in Montana. 
Had Warner committed the Montana DUI in Idaho, she would have been subject to Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A. That statute gives authority to the Department to suspend the driving privileges of a 
person who commits a DUI in Idaho. The statute also reads that if the present DUI is the second DUI 
within five years, then the license suspension would be for one year. Therefore, had Warner committed 
the act of driving while under the influence in Idaho, instead of Montana, she would have been given a 
one-year suspension regardless of whether the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
criminal case or whether that offense resulted in a conviction of a second DUI, first DUI, or even a 
reckless driving charge. 
In fact, Idaho Code§ 18-8002A serves, in and ofitself, as grounds to suspend Warner's driving 
privileges for one year. Idaho Code§ 18-8002A(4)(a)(ii) provides that when a person is found to be 
driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004, the 
Department is to suspend the person's driver's license for a period of one year if it is the second such 
occasion within five years. Idaho Code§§ 49-324 mandates that the Department suspend the driver's 
license of individuals if the offense for which they were convicted were committed in Idaho would be 
"grounds" for the suspension. "Grounds" does not require a criminal statute or a penalty associated with 
a corresponding crime. Idaho Code§ 18-8002A would serve as "grounds" under Idaho Code§ 49-324 
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and,hadthe occurred in Idaho, W amer' s driver's license would have been suspended pursuant to 
18-8002A. 
However, despite the fact that had Warner committed the DUI in Idaho she would be subject to 
a one-year suspension, W amer argues that she should not be subject to a one-year suspension because 
she was not convicted of a second offense DUI in Montana. In simple terms-W amer wants a shorter 
suspension because the offense occurred in Montana. Such a position is an attempt to take advantage of 
the differences between the DUI laws in Montana and Idaho. 
Montana's DUI laws are very different than Idaho's. Compare I.C. § 18-8001 et seq. and 
Montana Code Annotated ("MCA") § 61-8-40 I et seq. As noted above, each state has an enhancement 
for a DUI based upon an excessive BAC, with Idaho drawing the line at .20 and Montana drawing the 
line at .16. Compare I.C. § I8-8004C with MCA§ 61-8-465(1). While both states have graduated 
penalties based upon how many prior DUis have been committed by a criminal defendant, those 
divisions differ considerably. Compare LC.§ 18-8005 with MCA§§ 61-8-714 and 61-8-722. One of 
the notable differences is how prior DUis are tabulated. For example, in Idaho, a conviction under 18-
8004( 1) ( a), (b ), and ( c ), along with "substantially conforming foreign criminal violation( s )" within the 
past 10 years are considered when determining whether the present DUI is a second DUI. LC. § 18-
8005( 4 ). In Montana, all prior Montana convictions are considered, regardless of when it occurred, and 
foreign DUis appear to be excluded from consideration. See MCA § 61-8-714(2)(a) ("a person 
convicted of a second violation of 61-8-40 I ... ); MCA § 61-8-401 ( declaring it unlawful to operate a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol "upon the way of this state open to the public"). 
W amer is seeking to have a reduced license suspension because the offense occurred outside 
Idaho's borders. However, as Idaho Code §§ 49-324 and 49-326 state, the license suspension is to 
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reflect as though the offense occurred Idaho. Had the offense occurred in Idaho, Warner's license 
would be suspended one year. 
C. The license suspension does not violate Warner's right to travel. 
Warner alleges that the license suspension violates her right to travel. "The suspension or 
revocation of driving privileges does not limit the right to travel, merely the means .... Suspension of 
driving privileges may make travel less convenient. There is no constitutional infringement, however." 
State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 172, 125 P.3d 522,528 (2005). Warner's driver's license suspension 
does not violate her right to travel. 
D. The suspension is independent of the criminal action. 
In her brief, Warner appears to argue that the administrative driver's license suspension is tied 
to and contingent upon the criminal proceedings. On page 4 of her brief, Warner argues that 
No matter how many prior convictions a person may have within the previous ten 
years, if that person is sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence 
conviction, the license suspension under Idaho law is for thirty-day absolute 
suspension, followed by sixty days of restricted driving privileges. LC. § 18-8005( 1 )( d). 
Warner also argues 
There is no question that a person who is convicted of a second offense DUI within 
Idaho shall have her privileges suspended for one year, with no restricted permit. See, 
LC.§ 18-8005(4)(e) ("Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an 
additionaly mandatory minimum period of one (I) year after release from confinement, 
during which one (1) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be 
granted."). But Ms. Warner was not convicted of a second offense DUI in Montana. 
Petitioner's Brief, p. 5. In disputing the one year suspension, Warner concludes, "To permit otherwise 
would impose sentences greater than the maximum permitted by Idaho law and would deny defendants 
the benefits of their bargains in the criminal courts." (Emphasis added). It is clear that Warner treats the 
license suspension as though it is a punishment, tied to the criminal case and having criminal 
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proceeding implications. 
administrative license suspensions are in nature--entirely independent 
of the criminal proceedings. As noted above, the Department can suspend a license regardless of 
whether the offense committed results in a conviction for a DUL 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the civil nature of administrative driver's license 
suspensions. J.n Buell v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 151 Idaho 257, 259, 254 P .3d 1253, 125 5 
(Ct. App. 2011), a driver was charged with a DUI after refusing to take a BAC test. The driver pled 
guilty to a DUI and, pursuant to the plea agreement, the BAC refusal matter was dismissed. Id. At 
sentencing the court suspended the driver's noncommercial driver's license for a period of ninety days. 
Id. The Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") sent the driver a letter, giving him notice that his 
CDL was disqualified for one year. Id. The driver appealed, arguing that the suspension ofhis CDL was 
so punitive that it was effectively a criminal penalty and the suspension would violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, subjecting the driver to multiple punishments for the same offense. 
Id. at 260,254 P.3d at 1256. 
J.n rejecting the driver's arguments, the Court noted that "the state's interest in preventing 
intoxicated person from driving far outweighs the individual's interest.. . " and that "the state has a 
strong remedial and nonpunitive reason for suspending driver's licenses." Id. at 263, 254 P .3d at 1259. 
The Court recognized that administrative suspensions "also serve to provide for the safety of the public 
at-large." Id. The Court stated that "Idaho appellate courts have not viewed driver's license suspensions 
as punishment." Id. Despite the CDL suspension taking place outside of the driver's criminal sentence 
and that sentencing having taken place in Idaho, the Court affirmed the suspension as it was civil in 
nature and unrelated to the criminal punishment. Id. at 260,264,254 P.3d at 1257, 1261. 
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-Similarly, the Department was authorized to suspend Warner's license despite the criminal case 
and without regard to the criminal proceedings and charge. It does not matter whether Warner 
was convicted of a first offense DUI, second offense DUI, or aggravated DUI in Montana. The driver's 
license suspension is civil, not criminal, and operates independently of the criminal action, including 
any deal or negotiation between Warner and the prosecuting jurisdiction, or how the prosecuting 
jurisdiction decides to prosecute the charge. All that matters is that the Montana conviction 
demonstrates the offense-that Warner was driving while under the influence-and with that, the 
Department is to suspend her license according to how many DUI violations she had. 
The emphasis and reliance Warner puts on the Montana criminal case is misplaced. 
E. Warner is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs. 
Warner asks this Court to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
That code section allows for the award of costs and fees against a nonprevailing party when that 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Warner's request should be denied 
for two reasons. 
First, Warner is not the prevailing party. As shown above, the Department was not only 
authorized to suspend Warner's license for one year, it was required to do so. Second, Warner has not 
demonstrated, or even argued, that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. As 
demonstrated above, the Department was acting under expressly granted authority, provided in two 
different statutes (Idaho Code §§ 49-324 and 49-326), and had two separate bases under which to 
suspend the license for one year (Idaho Code§§ 18-8002A and 18-8005). Warner did not contest the 
finding that she, in fact, operated a motor vehicle while having a BAC of .176 and had a prior DUI 
from 2012. Therefore, the Department had reasonable basis in fact and iaw to suspend Warner's 
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costs and 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the second time in less than t'vVO years, Wa..'"Iler operated a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. Based upon the facts gleaned from her Montana aggravated DUI conviction, the 
Department was required to suspend Warner's license for one year. Warner is not entitled to a reduced 
license suspension simply because Montana chose not to categorize and prosecute the offense as a 
second violation. The Court should affirm the Department and deny the Petition. 
DATED this 27th day of March, 2014. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Respondent argues that the one year suspension is warranted because the 
Department has an almost unfettered right to suspend a person's driving privileges when 
that suspension is based upon an out-of-state conviction. In doing so, Respondent ignores 
the limits placed upon the Department for a violation committed within the state. 
However, as demonstrated in the Petitioner's Opening Brief and below, that position is 
- neither supported by the applicable statutes nor the case law. 1 
-
2. RESPONDENT MISINTERPRETS THE APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Respondent argues the legislative history of the statute allows the Department to 
look at the "facts underlying the conviction" from another state, rather than the nature of 
the conviction itself. (See Respondent's Brief, hereinafter RB, at 8.) This argument must 
be rejected for two reasons; first, the hearing officer did not look at the "facts underlying 
the conviction," but only at the fact that there was a conviction for a DUI in Montana; and 
second, since the statute is not ambiguous on its face, there is no need to look at the 
"legislative intent."2 (Cf. RB 8.) 
1There is no dispute about the standard of review. This Court shall overturn the 
agency's determination if it finds that the decision is "(a) in violation of constitutional or 
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; ( c) made upon 
unlawful procedure; or (d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." LC. § 67-
5279(3). 
2Even if there was a reason to look at the legislative intent, Respondent makes no 
showing by reference to legislative history, that his proposed interpretation of the 
legislative intent is correct. Why would the legislature want the Department to examine 
the facts underlying each out-of-state conviction in order to determine the proper 
l 
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First, the Department's suspension was based only on the fact that Ms. Warner was 
a DUI Montana. (See, Agency Record, hereinafter "AR;' at 2 and 
Ms. Warner originally argued that the Department was basing its suspension on the 
Montana equivalent of an excessive DUI in Idaho. See, LC. § l 8-8004C. As a result, 
Ms. Warner provided proof that her BAC was below the standard set forth in the Idaho 
statute. There would have been no argument about a one year suspension if she had been 
- charged and convicted of having more than a .20 BAC because under Idaho law, her 
license would be suspended for one year. 
Second, because the Department did not look at the "facts underlying offense" in 
rejecting Ms. Warner's challenge, but based its decision on the existence of the Montana 
conviction, in conjunction with the prior Idaho violation, the Department cannot now seek 
to justify its suspension on other grounds. 
Third, the applicable statutes are clear and unambiguous - the Department has the 
authority to suspend a license "upon receiving notice of the conviction, administrative 
action, or court order ... of an offense, which if committed in Idaho, would be grounds 
for suspension .... " LC. § 49-324. Additionally, the Department may suspend if a 
driver "has committed an offense in another state or jurisdiction as evidenced by a 
suspension, when the Department is not permitted to look at the "underlying facts" for in 
state convictions? 
2 
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or administrative action, which committed Idaho 
for suspension. . ." § 49-326(l)(e) (emphasis added). 
These statutes provide the sole authority for the Department to impose a 
suspension in this case, and Ms. Warner has not contested that the Department has the 
"authority" to suspend her license. What is at issue is the lengt.h of the suspension and 
these statutes permit a suspension only for the term permitted by Idaho law, "if the 
- [crime] was committed in Idaho." 
In order to avoid the statutes' clear language, the Department wants this Court to 
ignore the basis for the suspension here - the fact that Ms. Warner was convicted of a 
first offense violation in Montana. The argument about another suspension being 
evidenced by a "court order or administrative action," is misplaced here. Certainly, had 
Ms. Warner received an "administrative action" from Montana suspending her license 
based on failing an evidentiary test, Idaho could use that as a basis for an equivalent 
suspension in Idaho. But the Department suspended her license upon receiving notice of 
her "conviction," not because of any administrative action. (AR at 2.) 
Indeed, the parties do not dispute the fact of the conviction for DUI is the sole 
basis of the suspension. (See, RB at 9.) And the parties do not dispute that the length of 
a suspension is limited by LC.§ 18-8005. (See RB at 8-9.) Moreover, Respondent's 
reliance on State v. Schall, 337 P.3d 647 (2014) only reinforces Petitioner's argument 
regarding the limitation on the length of any suspension based on DUI convictions. In 
3 
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Schall, the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether a defendant could challenge the 
existence of a prior conviction at a preliminary hearing. The court determined that a 
challenge at that time was not permitted. However, the court held that a defendant was 
not without a remedy to challenge a prior conviction in district court after preliminary 
hearing. 
Finally, this result does not leave a defendant without recourse to challenge 
the felony enhancement once in district court. A defendant can do so in 
either of two ways. First, a defendant can move in limine to strike the 
felony enhancement. See, e.g., State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 801, 172 
P.3d 555, 556 (Ct. App. 2007) (defendant moved in limine to strike a felony 
enhancement because the foreign DUI statute allegedly failed to conform to 
Idaho's DUI statute). Second, the defendant may object to the admissibility 
of evidence purporting to establish that a foreign conviction is substantially 
conforming. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 892, 231 P .3d 532, 
537 (Ct. App. 2010) (considering defendant's argument that the district 
court improperly admitted evidence, over the defendant's objection, 
concerning foreign convictions). Both alternatives were available to Schall. 
Id. at 655. 
Additionally, if a defendant successfully challenges a prior conviction, neither the 
court nor the Department can impose a sentence longer than that authorized by LC.§ 18-
8005. In State v. Halford, 124 Idaho 411, 860 P.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1993), a defendant who 
had two prior convictions but entered a plea to the charge of a first offense, unenhanced 
DUI, was sentenced to a suspension greater than permitted by LC. § 18-8005. The trial 
court imposed a sentence greater than the maximum for a first offense, including a one 
year license suspension. On appeal, the sentence was reversed: "We hold only that in the 
proper exercise of its sentencing discretion, the trial court must confine itself to the 
4 
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-maximum penalty for the offense to which the defendant pied guilty." Id. at 414. 
Thus, if Ms. Warner had been convicted of the first offense Montana charge Ln the 
State of Idaho, the court and the Department could only treat her as a first time offender 
and impose the maximum suspension set forth in LC. § 18-8005(1 ). And this is all Ms. 
W amer has been seeking throughout the proceedings in the Department and before this 
Court. 
3. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DEPARTMENT CAN 
ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPEND MS. WARNER'S LICENSE WITHOUT 
LIMITS MUST BE REJECTED 
Respondent first argues that Ms. Warner's license could have been suspended 
administratively under LC. § 18-8002A. The Court must reject this argument for two 
reasons: first, the Department never notified Ms. Warner that her license was being 
suspended under this section, thereby violating her right to due process of law under the State 
and Federal Constitutions, see, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and State v. 
Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 (2013); and second, there is no proof that the State 
- complied with the prerequisites set forth in section l 8-8002A(2) for a proper administrative 
license suspension under this section. 
On appeal, a party cannot change the playing field and raise new issues not 
presented below. The Department notified Ms. Warner of her suspension based only on 
her Montana conviction. (AR at 2.) The hearing officer found that despite the fact that 
her conviction in Montana was for a first offense violation, the Department could 
5 
75 
-consider her prior Idaho offense under section 18-8005 and impose a one-year 
(AR Raising the issue of another ground the suspension for the 
first time on appeal is not permitted. See, e.g., Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 
265 P.3d 1144 (2011). 
Even if the Department was able to raise this argument here, the record contains no 
evidence that Ms. Warner was advised pursuant to section 18-8002A(2) and therefore the 
license suspension cannot be upheld. 
Thus, Respondent's argument that Ms. Warner is seeking a lesser suspension 
"because the offense was committed in Montana" (RB at 12) must be rejected. She seeks 
only to have the same suspension imposed as if she was convicted of a first offense in 
Idaho. See, State v. Halford, supra. 
4. RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE ON THE COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSE 
STATUTE MUST BE REJECTED 
Respondent next argues that the Department has the administrative authority to 
suspend a license, separate and distinct from the imposition of a court suspension, relying 
on a case interpreting the rules related to commercial licenses. (RB 14-16, citing Buell v. 
Idaho Department of Transportation, 151 Idaho 257,254 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 2011).) 
However, Respondent's reliance on this distinct statute regulating commercial drivers is 
misplaced. 
First, the Legislature had set forth a specific license suspension for a commercial 
license upon a conviction of a specific crime. See, LC. § 49-335. The Department itself 
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did not create the length or basis for the suspension of a commercial license and this 
statute has no impact on a non-commercial license to operate a motor vehicle. See, § 
49-105(16). Also, the length of the suspension must be based on the fact of the 
conviction. Thus, in Buell, the sole question was whether this statute violated the double 
jeopardy clause of the State and Federal Constitutions. Ms. Warner has never argued that 
the Department's suspension of her license runs afoul of the double jeopardy clauses or 
that the Department has no authority to impose some license suspension. Her argument 
has always been that under the applicable statutes, the Department is limited to the length 
of the suspension based upon a conviction of a first offense DUI, in Idaho. 
Second, Respondent can point to no statute which permits the Department to 
impose a one year suspension solely because it examined its own records to locate a prior 
offense. If Respondent's bootstrapping argument that the Department has the right to 
suspend for a period of time greater than that set forth in I.C. § 18-8005 is accepted, there 
would be no limit on the scope of the suspension imposed by the Department for 
defendants who are convicted within Idaho. But as the hearing officer recognized, the 
sole authority to suspend Ms. Warner's license is found in sections 49-326 and 18-8005. 
The Department has pointed to no case where it imposed a greater suspension than 
ordered by an Idaho court upon a conviction for a first offense, even if the defendant had 
uncharged or dismissed prior convictions. Cf., State v. Halford, supra, (limiting 
suspension to maximum provided by statute). 
7 
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5. MS. WARNER'S RIGHT TO TRAVEL WAS VIOLATED 
Respondent argues a license suspension does not violate the constitutional 
right to travel, citing State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 125 P.3d 522 (2005). (See RB 14.) 
However, Respondent's reliance on Bennett is misplaced. There the defendant argued 
that a suspension authorized by statute and imposed upon a valid conviction did not 
violate the right to travel, a claim rejected by the court which stated: 
The suspension or revocation of driving privileges does not limit the right to 
travel, merely the means. Typically punishments interfere with travel. Jail 
prevents it. Fines limit the opportunity in some instances. Suspension of 
driving privileges may make travel less convenient. There is no 
constitutional infringement, however. 
Id. at 172. 
Ms. Warner is not arguing a license suspension in and of itself violates the right to 
travel, as she has conceded that a shorter suspension is proper here. Rather she claims 
that imposing a greater suspension based solely on her out-of-state travel creates the 
constitutional violation. The violation is found in the Department's claim that it has the 
ability to impose double the suspension on her only because her conviction occurred 
outside the state. This double standard creates the infringement on her right to travel. All 
she asks is that she be treated, as the applicable statutes require, equally with the person 
who is convicted of the same crime in Idaho. 
8 
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CONCLUSION 
the foregoing reasons and those set forth the Opening Brief, Ms. Warner 
respectfully requests that this Court set aside the one-year suspension and order that the 
Department may only impose a license suspension for a first offense DUI if committed 
within the State ofidaho, with credit for the time before Ms. Warner's license suspension 
was stayed. Further, as the prevailing party, it is requested that the Court award 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs to Ms. Warner. 
Dated thisJbl day of April, 2015. 
~.0vL 
k<lrew Parnes 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Department of Transportation and advises this Court that all briefing ordered in this matter has been 
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Courtroom of the Blaine County Courthouse, 201 2nd Avenue South, Hailey, Idaho, on the 4th day 
of May, 2015, at 11:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as""'""""' can heard. 
DATED this '1-t:., day of April, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the~ day of April, 2015, he caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
Andrew Parnes (X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Attorney at Law ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 5988 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 (X) Facsimile 
(208) 726-1187 
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,, 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Timothy J. Stover 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303- 1428 
Telephone: (208) 736-9900 
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929 
ISB #4842 
APR 22 2015 
~11 -~· a.rt Di6trict r;nanlf!I Cou lelaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 2014-784 
RESPONDENT'S 
AUGMENTATION OF BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Respondent, the State of Idaho Depa1tment of Transportation 
("Department"), by and through its counsel of record, Special Deputy Attomey General Timothy J. 
Stover, and hereby submits the following supplemental persuasive authority pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(r) 
and LA.R. 34(t)(l). 
RESPONDENT'S AUGMENT A TlON OF BfUEF - I 
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Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of a decision issued by the Honorable D. Duff McKee in 
situation as this case. The entire Memorandum 
Decision applies to sections V. A and V. D (pages 7-12, 14-16) of Respondent's Brief. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 22nd day of April, 2014, he caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
ANDREW PARNES 
671 First Avenue North 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, Id 83340 
RESPONDENT'S AUGMENTATION OF BR1EF - 2 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(x) Facsimile 
(208) 726-1187 
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S 
IN TH! DISTRICT COURT OP THE FOUR'ffl JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TB Of' IDIJIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID PAUL BAUMGART 
Petitioner, 
VI, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DSPARTMENT 
Respondent. 
Cue No, CV OC 08 06504 
MEMORANDUM DECJS(ON 
This cue ia before tho courc on ptlirion ror judicial mlew from an adtnihimalive 
dri\'cr's li""'e suspenaionorder cmtm:d by the Idaho Transportation DcpartmeL the 
issue presented hu been fully hriefcd and lhc cue has boon submitted (or da:iaian 
withowt oral argumenr. 
Issue Pracated 
. 
Tho solo isauc presented in this cue is whether a jl&dlfflCllt of conviction of 
clri\linll under the influence o( alcohol in another slate lhat is denominated • "fiffl 
offense .. cindet lhat staae•s DUI laws can be c:onsideM a second offinlo in this state for 
the purpose or"' admini11na1ivc license suSpcnsion proc:Slding in Idaho. For reasons 
111tcd. I conclude th11 it c:an. and I afflnn lhe otdc:r or suspension in this cue. 
Memorandum Dcc:iaion Pase-- I 
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Facts and Procedural History 
The facts are not disputed. Baumgart, a resident of Idaho and the holder of an 
Idaho driver's license, was convicted in Idaho of driving under the influence of alcohol in 
Au1us1 of 2007. For purposes here, this was Baumgart's admitted 04first offense." 
In September of 2007, he was arrested in Nebraska and charged with driving 
under the influence there. On January s. 2008, he submitted a ''Plea In Absentia," 
apparently pursuant to a plea agreement with the county attorney in Nebraska. pleading 
guilty to 41Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol - First Offense." This plea was 
ac<:eptcd by the court jn Nebraska and he was duly sentenced in a manner consistent with 
a first offense conviction. 
rn duo course. the Nebraska authorlliC$ notified the [daho Transportation 
Department of the Nebraska proceedings. The ITD promptly notified Baumgart that hi5 
ldaho driver's license would be administratively suspended in Idaho for a period of one 
year, on the basis that the Nebraska DUI conviction was his "second offense0 within ten 
years, and as is proscribed by I.C. § 18-8004 and 18-SOOS. 
Baumgart requested a hearing. The hearing officer, notwithstanding the terms of 
the plea agreement and plea in Nebraska, concluded that the conviction there WIIS his 
second conviction. and therefore the one year suspension was appropriate under the fdaho 
statutes. 
Baumgart filed a timely appeal to this court. 
Analysis 
The Idaho starute in question reads as follows: 
t.C. § 49·324. Suspending resident's license 11nd privileges upon 
c:onvictlon. adminlstratiYe action or court erder In another state or 
Memorandum Decision Page~· 2 
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Jurisdlcden. - The depanment shall suapcnd, disqualify or revoke the 
driver's license or privilege of any resident of this state or the privilege 
of a nonresident to operate a motor vehicle in this state upon receiving 
notice of the conviction. administrative action or court order of that 
person in another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed 
in this state, would be grounds for the suspension. disqualification or 
revocation of the drivers license and privileges of the driver. The 
department ihall forward a certified copy or electronic transfer to the 
national driver register. 
Baumgart argues that the plea in Nebraska was for a "first offense,'' which in 
Idaho would only result in a lesser license suspension. with the possibility of some 
privileges. He argues that the ITO cannot consider the Nebraska conviction as a "second 
offense" .in order to bring this case wi1hin lhc reach of I.C. § t 8-8005( 4), which mandates 
an absolute one year suspension, with no exceptions. upon a second conviction within ten 
years. 
I am not persuaded. The basic DUI statutes are essentially identical between 
Idaho and Nebraska. Neither of the basic statutes against driving while intoxicated makes 
any distinction between first and subsequent offenses. The only distirletion in Idaho 
between first and subsequent offenses comes in another statute pertaining to the penalty 
that might be imposed - J.C. § 18-8005. Here, that Baumgart's offense was treated by 
the Nebraska court as a first offense for sentencing purposes does not change the basic 
fact that Baumgart was arrested and convicted for DUl in Nebraska within ten years of 
his arrest and conviction in Idaho of essentially the same offense. 
To state my conclusion another way, I.C. § 49-324, the enabling statute 
authorizing administrative 1icense suspensions in Idaho for offenses committed 
elsewhere, is governed by the operative provisions of the foreign state's laws penaining 
to the crimes described therein. The authority granted by this section is not limited or 
Memorandum Decision Page·· 3 
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connected to any sentencing provision in the foreign s,11te. Here, there is no dispute Chat 
the Nebraska DUI statute under which Baumgart was arrested and convicted was 
essentially the same as that of Idaho in its operative parts. It is not disputed that this was, 
in fact. Baumgart's second conviction within ten years. Whether the Nebraska authorities 
knew of the Idaho conviction is irrelevant The fact that Nebraska called it a "first 
offense" is irrelevant. None or these considerations limit the administrative authority of 
the ITD in an administrative license suspension proceeding upon learning of the 
circumstance ofBaumgart's second DUI conviction within ten years. 
Conclusion 
There is no reason to disturb the findings and order of the hearing officer in lhis 
cue. and the resultant final order of the Idaho Transportation Department. The final order 
is affinned in all respects. The stay order htretofore entered is vacated. 
Dated tbisZ.-i~ay of September, 2008. 
':::::::':::,.. 
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
Memorandum Decision Page-· 4 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILINO 
I hereby certify that on this 24111 day of September, 2008, I mailed (served) a true and 
com::ct copy of the within instnimen, to: 
I.arty D. Scou 
SCOTT & HACKNEY, PU.C 
SOO W Bannock 
Boise, ID 83702 
J. Timothy Thomas 
IDAHO ATt'ORNBY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
POBoit 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
J. DA V1D NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Di · ct Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2014-0000784 
Susan Jane Lauer vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation 
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing date: 5/4/2015 
Time: 10:59 am 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy Stover 
Party: Susan Lauer, Attorney: Andrew Parnes 
Counter# 
11.06 Counsel present. 
Court introduces the case. 
11.07 Mr. Parnes present exhibit -briefs 
Court had exhibit marked as Petitioner's Exh. A- ADMITTED. 
Mr. Parnes begins oral argument. 
11.18 Court inquires about suspensions. 
Mr. Parnes responds and continues. 
11.34 Court inquires about conviction. 
Mr. Parnes responds. 
Mr. Stover responds. 
11.49 Court inquires. 
Mr. Stover responds. 
11.58 Mr. Parnes responds. 
12.17 Court comments. 
Mr. Stover comments 
12.20 Mr. Parnes responds. 
12.24 Court takes the matter under advisement and will issue a written decision. 
Mr. Stover comments. 
Mr. Parnes comments. 
12.26 Recess 
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I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Susan Jane Warner, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 
Respondent. 
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-784 
) 
) DECISION ON APPEAL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PROCEDURAL IDSTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner: Andrew Parnes, Ketchum. 
For Respondent, State ofidaho Department of Transportation: Timothy Stover and Kirk 
Melton, Twin Falls. 
On April 5, 2012 Susan Warner, hereinafter Warner, was cited for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol-2nd Offense, in violation of Montana Code Annotated §61 - 8-401(1)(a) 
after being involved in a single car accident and submitting to a breath test and subsequent blood 
1 
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draw. Amended Agency Record, hereinafter AAR, p. 35-38. Warner previously was convicted 
in Idaho resulting in Montana citing her for a second DUL Id. at 8. The breath 
test resulted in a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .179 while the blood draw revealed a BAC of 
.176. Id. On July 23, 2014, the State of Montana amended the charge against Warner to 
Aggravated DUI, in violation of MCA§ 61-8-465(1)(a), driving with a blood alcohol 
concentration in excess of 0.16 or more and dropping the "2°d" notation. Id. at 22. Warner pled 
guilty to the amended charge and was sentenced on September 16, 2014. Id. at 21. The 
conviction and sentence in Montana was not for a second offense and the sentencing court did 
not suspend Warner's license. Id. There has been no argument that the Montana code is not 
substantially conforming, except as to the BAC required for an aggravated DUI. This Court does 
find that the Montana statute is substantially conforming, except as to the Montana provisions 
regarding aggravated DUI. 1 
After receiving notice of the conviction from the State of Montana, the Idaho 
Transportation Department (hereinafter Department) sent Warner notification of a one year 
absolute suspension of her Idaho driving privileges on September 23, 2014, with the suspension 
effective on October 9, 2014. Id. at 2-3. Warner contested the length of the suspension on 
October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A hearing was held on October 16, 2014 and the hearing officer 
upheld the suspension on October 31, 2014. Id. at 25-27. Warner filed a Petition for 
1 It is self-evident from the citation and record that Warner's Montana DUI could have been considered a z"d under 
Montana's statutory scheme regardless of whether Montana reviews the prior 10 years of a person's driving 
record or some other number of years. 
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Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The hearing officer denied the petition on November 15, 2014. 
at Warner filed this Petition for Judicial Review on December 4, 2014. at 43. 
Importantly, the issue on appeal is not whether Warner's license may be suspended (she 
concedes it can), but the length of the suspension.2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A Court may overturn an agency's decision only when the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. 
§ 67-5279(3). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Can the Department Administratively Suspend Warner's License for a Period of One 
Year Pursuant to LC.§ 18-8002A. 
2 Likewise, both parties agree that I.C. § 49-324 and/or I.C. § 49-326 permit the Department to suspend Warner's 
license. 
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Without the benefit of § 18-8002A to suspend Warner's license for l year, can the 
Department apply the penalties for a second offense DUI pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(e) 
regardless of the form of the conviction? 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Can the Department Administratively Suspend Warner's License for a Period of One 
Year Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(A). 
The State argued in its brief and at oral argument that had Warner been driving in the 
State ofldaho, her license would have been suspended almost immediately by the Department 
after they received notice from the peace officer of Warner's failed test pursuant to I.C. §18-
8002A, for a period of one year. Warner asserts that any argument by the State pertaining to I.C. 
§ l 8-8002A must be rejected because (i) the issue was not presented below and (ii) even if this 
Court does consider I.C. § 18-8002A, there has been no showing that the requirements of this 
statute have been met for the Department to administratively suspend Warner's license for 
failing an evidentiary test in Montana. The Department's argument regarding LC. §18-8002A is 
in response to Petitioner's Equal Protection argument; specifically, that Warner is requesting 
favorable treatment (not equal treatment) because if she had been stopped in Idaho her license 
would have been automatically suspended much sooner and for a period of one year. The Court 
will address this issue directly. 
4 
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1. The State has not raised the issue of a license suspension pursuant to LC. § 18-
~~u,~, ~ until this appeal. Specifically, the 'Notice of Suspension' sent to Warner on September 
23, 2014 states "according to the court record you were convicted [emphasis added] on 
September 16, 2014 for: drvng unr infl alc/drugs/intox subs I.C. 49-324 in the court of: MT."3 
AAR p. 2. In other words, nothing in the 'Notice of Suspension' indicates that Warner's license 
was suspended based on a failed test, the sole basis for a license suspension pursuant to LC. § 
18-8002A. Moreover, the hearing officer concluded that "Idaho Code, section 18-8005( e) 
provides that the driving privileges shall be suspended for a period of one (1) year with 
absolutely no driving privileges of any kind allowed during that period." Id. at 27. The hearing 
officer made no reference or finding in regard to LC. § 18-8002A. The State may not now raise 
LC. § l 8-8002A as a basis for the suspension on appeal. 
11. More importantly, assuming the Department was able to raise this issue on appeal, 
notwithstanding their failure to raise this issue earlier, there has been no evidence presented that 
the requirements of LC. § 18-8002(A) were met by the peace officers and/or the Department in 
this case. Specifically, there has been no showing that Warner was advised pursuant to section 
l 8-8002A(2). 
The fact that section l 8-8002A requires every Idaho peace officer and/or the Department 
to follow certain procedures before a person's license can be suspended administratively may 
3 I.C. § 49-324 does not specifically instruct the Department on the length of suspension but instead implicitly 
requires them to refer to other statutes pertaining to the offense, in this case I.C. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8005. As 
already stated the notice does not refer to !.C. § 18-8002A. It also does not refer to I.C. § 18-8005, the other 
instructive statute for the imposition of a license suspension in this case. However, the notice makes clear that the 
suspension is based on a conviction in Montana, not a failed test, making I.C. 18-8005 the controlling statute in this 
case because it enumerates the specific penalties for a person found guilty (convicted) of a DUI in Idaho. 
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also support the Petitioner's Equal Protection argument. These requirements, although most 
likely easy to fulfill by peace officers, lead this Court to believe that administrative license 
suspensions pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A are not as automatic as the Department would have this 
Court believe. What if the peace officer fails to advise or misadvises a person during evidentiary 
testing? What if the calibration on the testing equipment does not comply with the Department's 
requirements? In all situations where the Department cannot suspend a driver's license upon the 
failure of an evidentiary test ( or refusal for that matter), this Court presumes that any license 
suspension stems solely from the conviction and judgment entered by the court. As a result, 
regardless of whether it was a person's fifth DUI or first DUI, the Court is bound by the 
maximum penalties as stated in I.C. § 18-8005. Any person that bargains with the prosecutor to 
plead guilty to a first offense DUI receives the benefit of that bargain, and a license suspension 
only as directed in section 18-8005(1 )( d). 
The Department cannot use LC. §I8-8002A as a basis for their argument that Warner's 
license should be suspended for a period of one year. 
2. Without the benefit ofl.C. § 18-8002A to suspend Warner's license for 1 year, can 
the Department apply the penalties for a second offense DUI pursuant to I.C. § 18-
8005( e) regardless of the form of the conviction? 
Idaho Code section 49-324 gives the department the authority to suspend an Idaho 
resident's driver's license upon committing an offense in another state. Specifically it reads: 
49-324. Suspending resident's license and privileges upon conviction, 
administrative action or court order in another state or jurisdiction. - The 
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department shall suspend, disqualify or revoke the driver's license or privilege of 
any resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to operate a motor 
vehicle in this state upon receiving notice of the conviction, administrative action 
or court order of that person in another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, 
committed in this state would be grounds for the suspension, disqualification or 
revocation of the driver's license and privileges of the driver. The department 
shall forward a certified or electronic transfer to the national driver register. 
In Warner's case, the suspension arose when the Department received notice of her DUI 
conviction in Montana. Warner argues that because it was a conviction for a first offense DUI, 
the administrative suspension cannot be any longer than she would have received had she been 
convicted and sentenced for a first offense DUI in Idaho rather than in Montana. The 
Department argues that Warner committed a DUI and the number of prior DUI's within the most 
recent 10 year period only acts to enhance the penalty for the offense of DUI. Moreover the 
Department argues that Warner's interpretation of the statute provides her a free bite. 
1. What is the intent and/or purpose ofl.C. 49-324? 
This may seem basic, but this Court believes the legislative intent of this statute is to give 
the Department the authority to suspend an Idaho resident's driver's license when they commit 
offenses in other states that, if committed in Idaho, would lead to a mandatory suspension. In 
other words, if an Idaho resident commits an offense in another state and that offense, if 
committed in Idaho, requires a license suspension, then the Department is authorized to suspend 
the resident's driver's license as if the offense had been committed in Idaho. There is nothing in 
this statute that gives the Department discretion to assume what would have happened had the 
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offense been committed in Idaho or to review their records to impose a greater suspension than 
mandated or required had the offense been committed Idaho.4 
The parties by and iarge agree with this interpretation of the statute but disagree whether 
it is the actual conviction or simply the offense of DUI that authorizes the Department to suspend 
Warner's license. In other words, the Department argues there is no distinction in Idaho between 
first and subsequent DUI offenses; the only distinction comes in another statute pertaining to the 
penalty that might be imposed - I.C. § 18-8005. However, the argument here pertains only to 
the penalty that can be imposed, not whether or not Warner received a DUI. Moreover, there is 
great degree of prosecutorial discretion in terms of what offense was committed and what the 
conviction enters for. This includes the ability of the prosecutor to bargain for a plea to reckless 
driving regardless of the number of prior DUI offenses. The question to be answered then is: 
what penalty would have definitively been imposed based on the conviction, not what penalty 
could have or probably would have been imposed if Warner received this DUI while driving in 
Idaho. 
ii. How long would Warner's license suspension be if the offense had occurred in 
Idaho? 
This is a relatively straight forward question when the basic facts are examined. Warner 
had (1) received a prior DUI in the previous 10 years, (2) tested at a blood alcohol content of 
4 As discussed above in section (l)(ii) a license suspension pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A is not automatic or definite. 
On the other hand a conviction for a DUI mandates the court impose a license suspension for some period of time 
depending on the conviction. 
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less than what is required for an aggravated DUI in Idaho, (3) pied guilty and was 
sentenced to a first offense DUI as evidenced by the amended criminal complaint ( despite being 
originaliy charged with a second), and (4) there has been no evidence showing that I.C. § 18-
8002A was complied with by the Department/state; therefore a license suspension pursuant to 
that statute cannot be upheld. Importantly this suspension is based on the notice of conviction 
and/or court order, neither of which imposed a license suspension of any length oftime.5 
While the Department places utmost importance on the fact that W amer had been 
convicted of a DUI in the last 10 years, this Court believes the Department would have no 
statutory basis under the same circumstances to suspend Warner's license for one year, without 
I.C. § I8-8002A, had this offense been committed and conviction entered in Idaho. 6 Moreover, 
without section l 8-8002A, this Court cannot find any statutory authority for the Department to 
administratively suspend a person's license convicted of a DUI in Idaho provided the Court 
imposes the proper penalty at sentencing. 7 Instead the sentencing Court would be limited to the 
5 Presumably had the Idaho Department of Transportation received notice of a license suspension pursuant to a 
Montana Court Order or an administrative order from the Montana Department of Transportation, the Idaho 
Department could give full faith and credit to that suspension/order regardless of the length. For example, if 
Montana orders a one year license suspension for all first offense DUls, and there was no argument that it was 
actually a second offense DUI (as there is in this case), the Idaho DOT could suspend a person's license for 1 year. 
Idaho would not be required to decrease the length of suspension to 90 days and allow the person to drive in all 
states except Montana after 90 days. In other words, people are subject to the laws and penalties of the state 
they are in and Idaho is in no position to tell other states that they are wrong. Here there was no license 
suspension ordered by Montana for an offense that would carry a mandatory suspension in Idaho and therefore 
the Idaho DOT is permitted to enter its own pursuant to I.C. § 49-326. 
6 This is assuming that Warner would have been able to bargain with an Idaho prosecutor for a first offense DUI. 
This type of bargain frequently occurs throughout Idaho between DUI offenders and prosecutors for any number 
of reasons regardless of whether the Department has suspended a person's driver's license pursuant to LC. § 18-
8002A. 
7 1.C. § 49-326(1)(a) appears to provide authority for an administrative suspension if the Court fails to impose a 
mandatory license suspension at sentencing. However nothing in this statute gives the Department discretion to 
count the number of prior DUl's and suspend a driver's license based on the Department's records. Instead the 
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license suspension enumerated in section 18-8005 for the crime to which the person pled 
guilty regardless of how many prior DUI's the Idaho driver had received in the preceding 10 year 
period. The prosecutor has the discretion to strike any prior convictions from their complaint in 
the course of bargaining for a guilty plea Therefore the offense committed depends entirely on 
the conviction. This Court cannot conceive that the intent of the Idaho legislature is to allow the 
Department, after receiving notice of an Idaho DUI conviction, to subsequently review their own 
records and impose a separate administrative license suspension based on their review instead of 
based on the form of the conviction. Likewise, the Department must honor the bargain reached 
in the out-of-state criminal case regardless of whether it is the person's second or fifth DUI. 
Similarly, if a defendant successfully challenges a prior conviction, neither the Court nor 
the Department can impose a sentence longer than that authorized by I.C. § 18-8005. In State v. 
Halford, 124 Idaho 411,860 P.2d 27 (Ct App. 1993), a defendant entered a plea to first offense 
DUI, despite two prior convictions, and the court imposed a 1 year license suspension. On 
appeal, the sentenced was reversed: "We hold only that in the proper exercise of its sentencing 
discretion, the trial court must confine itself to the maximum penalty for the offense to which the 
defendant pled guilty." Id. at 414. It would make no sense to require a court to confine itself to 
the maximum penalty for the offense to which the defendant pled guilty but to allow the 
Department discretion to suspend a person's license based on a review of its records. (Once 
again this is assuming, as in this case, that LC. § 18-8002A cannot be applied). 
statute limits any administrative suspension to the length of time that is statutorily mandated for a given 
conviction. 
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Department argues simply that had the offense been committed in Idaho Warner 
have had her license suspended for one year either pursuant to § 18-8002A or based on a 
conviction for a second offense within 10 years. These are merely assumptions that, for reasons 
discussed above, may or may occur. Restated simply, the prosecutor has discretion to bargain 
with the offender for a plea to lesser offense8 and an administrative license suspension pursuant 
to § l 8-8002A is not automatic. 
The Department cannot and does not use discretion by reviewing their records when 
receiving notice of Idaho convictions. Likewise, the Department cannot use discretion when 
receiving notice of an out of state conviction when the statute is substantially conforming to the 
Idaho statutes. The intent of the statute is to impose a license suspension for an offense 
committed outside of Idaho as if the offense was committed within Idaho. If the Department was 
free to use its discretion in all cases, the legislative intent of the statute would be lost. It makes 
no sense to construe the Idaho statutes to allow the Department to do more than the sentencing 
court can do, especially without some clear legislative authority. In this case, the Department 
must confine Warner's license suspension to the maximum penalty for the offense to which 
Warner pled guilty pursuant to§ 18-8005. That is a first offense DUL 
Conclusion 
Warner pied guilty in Montana to a first offense DUL The maximum license suspension 
that can be imposed for a first offense DUI is enumerated in I.C. § 18-8005(1)(e). Warner's 
8 A DUI can be amended to a lesser DUI (by striking prior DUls from the complaint) or even to a reckless driving 
depending on the circumstances and the prosecutor. The offense committed is not the offense for which a driver, 
or any criminal, is cited for, but the crime to which they are found guilty of or plead guilty to. 
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license shall be suspended for thirty (30) days absolutely and she shall have restricted privileges 
the following sixty ( 60) days. Any additional suspension exceeds the maximum permitted. 
DATED this :2S day of June 2015. 
By:RO~ 
District Court Judge 
12 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the -2di;;__ day of June 
5. have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document: 
Andrew Parnes, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 5988 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
aparnes@rnindspring.com 
Timothy Stover 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
905 Shoshone St. N. 
PO Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
w1'S@;m~1(Nol~(9,w.~ 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
.L{ Email 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Telecopy 
j_Email 
u 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
Susan Jane Warner, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 
Respondent 
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-784 
) 
) ORDER OF REMAND TO IDAHO 
) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
The above- entitled matter having come before the Court on appeal from an agency 
determination made by the Idaho Dept. of Transportation, and the Court having rendered its Decision 
on Appeal, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that this matter is remanded to the Idaho Dept. 
of Transportation, with instructions to shorten the period of Warner's driver's license suspension in 
conformity with the Decision on Appeal. 
DATED this i_ day of July, 2015. 
By: ~~ ROBERTELEE 
District Court Judge 
104 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the _1__ day of July 
5. I have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document: 
Andrew Parnes, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 5988 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
aparnes@mindspring.com 
Timothy Stover 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
905 Shoshone St. N. 
PO Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
\viS€, /YIAflj l Va f lt<j-lftW ·Ulrl.. 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
T;,Telecopy 
4Email 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
Telecopy 
J{Email 
~ Deputy Clerk 
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ANDREW PARNES, #4110 
Attorney at Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Fl ED P.M 
JUL O 9 2015 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 726-1010 
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187 
JoLynn Dr8/il6, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coun , Idaho 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAThTE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014-784 
:tv1E1v10RANDUM OF A TTOR.i"t\JEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, by and through her attorney of 
record, Andrew Parnes, and submits this Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
12/4/2014 
01/02/2015 
I. 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
Filing Fee: Petition 
Transcript Fee 
Total 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
$221.00 
$ 75.00 
$296.00 
106 
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II. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Petitioner respectfully requests attorney fees in the amount of $3,410 pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
represents 12.4 hours at $275 per hour for work only on the proceedings in this matter. 
TOT AL FEES AND COSTS: 
DATED this Gt~ay of July, 2015. 
a~1.12 
~wPrune~ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IviEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
$3,410 
2 
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0 ll :04 AM And Parnes 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3_ day of July, 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method 
marked herein: 
TIMOTHY J. STOVER 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248 
'f.. By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736-9929. 
By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the 
post office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
Emi~c.H--:::::-
MEMORAND{JM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 3 
4 
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.. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Timothy J. Stover 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
Telephone: (208) 736-9900 
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929 
ISB #4842 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 2014-784 
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW the Respondent, the State of Idaho Department of Transportation 
("Department"), by and through its counsel of record, Special Deputy Attorney General Timothy J. 
Stover, and hereby submits its Objection to Petitioner's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs as 
follows: 
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEf:S AND COSTS - I 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, filed a Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs, seeking an 
award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54( e ). Warner's request 
does not satisfy Idaho Code Section 12-117 or Rule 54(e) and therefore should be denied. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
l. Warner's request does not satisfy Rule 54(e). 
Warner's request under Rule 54(e) is untimely. 1 Rule 54(e) requires a party to submit an 
affidavit of the attorney in conjunction with the memorandum within fourteen days of the judgment. 
"[F]ailure to verify a memorandum of costs, including attorney fees, renders it subject to timely 
objection .... " Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 883, 693 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Ct. App. 1984). As no 
verification accompanied the memorandum of costs and fees, such memorandum is untimely. 
Even if Warner's request had been verified, it would not satisfy Rule 54(e). Rule 54(e)(3) 
provides the factors the Court is to consider in awarding fees. However, Warner presents no 
information as to any one of those factors. "We believe it is incumbent upon a party seeking attorney 
fees to present sufficient information for the court to consider factors as they specifically relate to the 
prevailing party or parties seeking fees." Hackettv. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261,264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1375 
( Ct. App. 1985). "Thus, because a court must consider all of the Rule 54( e )(3) factors before awarding 
attorney fees, those fees are properly denied where the party claiming them does not provide the 
information necessary to permit the court to evaluate all of the factors." Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 
531,284 P.3d 970, 975 (2012). Additionally, Warner's failure to address those factors prohibits the 
1 The Department notes that Warner is seeking costs and fees under Rule 54(e). However, Rule 54(e) only addresses 
attorney's fees, not costs. Warner does not state under which rule she is seeking costs. 
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2 
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Department from being able to present adequate responses. Since Warner failed to provide facts or 
2. Warner's request does not satisfy ldaho Code Section 12-117. 
Warner's request is based upon Idaho Code Section 12-117. Warner does not provide any 
explanation as to how Idaho Code Section 12-1 i 7 appiies. Idaho Code Section 12-117(1) states, 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political 
subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, 
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. 
(Emphasis added). 
The. Department did not act ''without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Very simply, the 
Department submitted a decision from the Honorable D. Duff McKee that was directly on point to the 
present case. In Judge McKee's decision, he noted that there was no distinction between first and 
second DUI offenses in the basic statutes, but the distinction came with regards to the penalties that 
could be imposed. Judge McKee stated, "The authority granted by [Idaho Code Section 49-324] is not 
limited or connected to any sentencing provision in the foreign state." He also stated that the fact that 
the foreign jurisdiction called it a "first offense" DUI did not "limit the administrative authority of the 
ITD in an administrative license suspension proceeding upon learning of the circumstance of 
Baumgart's second DUI conviction within ten years." 
The Department also submitted case law stating that administrative driver's license suspensions 
were for public safety-not considered punishments--along with a case where the Idaho Supreme 
Court determined that the "offense" in a DUI case is the DUI itself, not the number ofDUis a person 
may have. Considering the language of Idaho Code Section 49-424 focuses on "offense[s]" and not 
OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3 
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"punishments" or of conviction," the Department's position that Warner's offense Montana 
was second offense ten requiring a one-year license suspension was well-rooted in and 
supp011ed by Idaho law. Therefore, the Department did not act "without a reasonable basis in law or 
fact" and Idaho Code Section 12-117 is not applicable.2 
HI. 
CONCULSION 
Warner seeks an award of costs and fees under Idaho Code Section 12-117 and Rule 54( e ). 
Those bases were not satisfied and therefore the request must be denied. 
DATED this 161h day of July, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 161h day of July, 2015, he caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
ANDREW PARNES 
671 First Avenue North 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, Id 83340 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(x) Facsimile 
(208) 726~1187 
2 The Department notes that Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides that fees and reasonable expenses may be awarded 
to the prevailing party. There is no mention of costs. lnasmuch as that code section's language can be interpreted to 
include costs, the Department's argument above applies. To the extent that it does not, Warner does not provide a 
statute indicating that costs may be awarded in this case. 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Timothy J. Stover ISB #4842 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248 
Telephone: (208) 736-9900 
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929 
E-mail: tjs@magicvalleylaw.com 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
Jolynn Drage, Clerlc District 
Court Blaine Coun , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner/ Appellee, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent/ Appellant. 
* * * * * 
) 
) Case No. CV 2014-784 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) (No filing fee pursuant to I.C. §67-2301) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED-APPELLEE, AND HER ATTORNEY, ANDREW PARNES, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, by and through its attorney of record, Timothy l Stover, appeals against the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l 
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above named Appellee by and through his attorney of record. Andrew Parnes, to the Idaho Supreme 
from the Decision on Appeal entered in the above-entitled action on June 25, 2015, and the Order 
of Remand to Idaho Department of Transportation entered on July 1, 2015, in the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Blaine, Case No. CV 2014-784 (together the ""District 
Court Decision"), Honorable Robert Elgee presiding. The District Court Decision was the decision on 
judicial review of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order dated October 
31, 2014, issued by the Idaho Department of Transportation's Administrative Hearing Examiner, 
Michael B. Howell, File No. MT TK.1400262 ("Hearing Officer Decision"). 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the District 
Court Decision described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellant Rule ll(t). 
3. The following is a preliminary statement of the issues which the Appellant intends to 
assert in the appeal. Such preliminary list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. 
a Did the District Court err by determining that the Department could not suspend 
Warner's driver's license for a period of one year? 
b. Was the Hearing Officer Decision in violation of constitutional provisions or 
Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(a)? 
c. Did the Hearing Officer Decision exceed the statutory authority granted to the 
Department of Transportation? 
d. Was the Hearing Officer Decision arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript in hard copy: Oral Argument on Appeal held before the District Court on May 4, 2015. 
6. The Appellant requests the following additional documents be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a. The transcript of the evidentiary hearing before the Department of 
Transportation hearing officer; 
b. A copy of the Amended Agency Record. 
c. A copy of Respondent's Brief. 
d. A copy of Respondent's Augmentation of Brief. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of who a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Susan P. Israel, CSR No. 244 
P.O. Box 1379 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
b. That the reporter has been paid directly the estimated fee for preparation of 
the transcript. 
c. That no appellate filing fee is required for agencies of the State of Idaho 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-2301. 
d. That no fee is required for the preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 67-2301. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 
DATED this 16th day of July, 2015. 
.-l'tiiiothy J. Stover 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 16th day of July, 2015, he caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
Andrew Parnes 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 726-1010 
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187 
E-mail: apames@mindspring.com 
Susan Israel 
P.O. Box 1379 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(x ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered ------.... 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Timothy J. Stover 
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ANDREW PARNES, ISB l 
' \ JUL 2 7 2015 
Attorney at Law 
671 First Avenue North Jolynn_ CJrage, a.rlc District Coitrt Bltllne CoJ!!!!Y: lflaho 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83 340 
Telephone: (208) 726-1010 
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPART1\1ENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I, Andrew Parnes, declare as follows: 
Case No. CV-2014-784 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW 
PARNES IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
OBJECTIONS REGARDING FEES 
AND COSTS 
1. I am the attorney for the Petitioner in the above-entitled action. 
2. I represented Petitioner in the proceedings before the Idaho Department of 
Transportation (Department). 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW P.4.RNES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING FEES AND COSTS 1 
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7 :48 PM And Pa.mes N D l. 
Because the Department denied Petitioner's request to reduce her license 
suspension to the ninety days permitted under Idaho law 
DUI, I had to file the instant Petition in District Court. 
a c.onviction a first time 
4. The filing fee for this Petition was $221 and I was required to pay the 
Department $75 to obtain the transcript of the Department hearing. 
5. My hourly rate in this case was $275 per hour, which is a reasonable hourly 
rate in Blaine ColUlty Idaho. 
6. My preparation of the Petition included the necessity of reviewing the 
record and researching both the law and constitutional issues. I spent 3 .5 hours preparing 
the petition. 
7. Because I had spent some time during the proceedings in the Department, I 
was able to prepare the brief filed in this case in 3.8 hours. J\..1y Reply Brief was prepared 
in 2.6 Hours. 
8. As Respondent filed an augmentation to its Brief shortly before the hearing 
in this matter, I had to spend additional time obtaining and reviewing briefing in that prior 
case. That time and oral argument in the case took an additional 2.5 hours. 
9. The total time for attorneys fees is a reasonable total of 12.4 hours, which 
totals $3,410 at the rate of $275 per hour. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW PARNES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING FEES AND COSTS 2 
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I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law the State of Idaho that the 
tor,egomg is true and correct. 
DATED this zriy of July, 2015. D 
wPames 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_ day of July, 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method 
marked herein: 
TIMOTHY J. STOVER 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248 
\/J By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736-9929. 
By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the 
post office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
Emily Dion 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW PARNES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING FEES AND COSTS 3 
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ANDREW PARNES, ISB #41 
Attorney at Law 
FILED~M~~__.., 
JUL 2 7 20t5 
1 First A venue North 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 726-1010 
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187 
L ~~~~9:r;: 
-.....:;::;:.:.:::=~-----·-- ----
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JCDIClAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPART.l\1ENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014-784 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS 
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS 
Petitioner, Susan Warner, by and through cowisel of record, hereby files this 
Response to Respondent's Objections to Memorandum of Fees and Costs. 
1. The Request for Fees and Costs was Timely 
This Court filed its memorandum decision on June 25, 2015, and its Order re 
Remand on July 1, 2015. Petitioner filed her request for fees and costs on July 9, 2015, 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING 
FEES AND COSTS l 
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fourteen days the Courf s decision and order. Therefore, this Court must reject 
Respondent's argument that the request was untimely. 
2. The Request was Sufficient under the Rules 
The request set forth the specific costs and the proper basis for the fees. 
Respondent contends that because the request was not verified, they must be denied. But 
the case relied upon by Respondent does not support this assertion. In that case, the party 
seeking fees submitted an affidavit before the hearing on fees, as Petitioner is doing in 
this case. (See, attached Affidavit of Andrew Parnes.) Thus, in Hackett v. Streeter, 109 
Idaho 261 (Ct. App 1985), any failure to file an affidavit at the time the request was 
initially made was not fatal to the claim for fees. Therefore, this Court can consider an 
affidavit of counsel prior to the hearing on the request for fees. 1 
3. Petitioner's Request Satisfies the Statute 
Petitioner is entitled to fees and costs because the positions taken by the 
Department were not made upon a reasonable basis in fact or la\V. Petitioner throughout 
the proceedings acknowledged that the Department could suspend her license for a first 
offense. At the Department level, the sole basis for rejection of this argument was that 
Idaho Code § 18-8005 permitted the suspension for one year. 
1Petitioner's counsel did not set a hearing on the request immediately in order to 
assess any response. By separate pleading, that hearing is now being set and noticed to 
Respondent. 
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However, on appeal, the Department asserted the first time that :tv1s. Warner's 
could be suspended for one year under the provisions of Administrative License 
Suspensions set forth in Idaho Code § l 8-8002A. This Court rejected that argument first 
under the waiver doctrine as the Department had not asserted this in the hearings below. 
In addition, this Court found that the Department had made no showing that the pre-
conditions for suspension under this section had been met under the facts of this case. 
Furthermore, the facts demonstrate that had the Department sought to suspend Ms. 
Warner's privileges under this section, the maximum suspension would have been a 
ninety day suspension, because the ALS suspension had been rescinded after her first 
arrest for DUI in Idaho. See Record at 9. Therefore, this argument was neither grounded 
in law or fact. 
Finally, Respondent argues solely that another District Judge's decision, not 
binding on this Court, justifies the denial of request for fees in this case. However, 
Respondent's Brief filed in this case on March 30, 2015, did not cite or rely on this other 
opinion. Respondent did not cite to this other opinion until April 22, 2015, three weeks 
after Petitioner filed her Reply Brief. Respondent's initial briefing therefore did not rely 
on that court's opinion. Indeed, because Respondent filed that augmentation less than 
two weeks before oral argument, Petitioner's counsel was required to complete additional 
work to demonstrate that the parties in that other case had not presented Judge 
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McKee with the full scope of arguments, including the constitutional issues raised in this 
case.2 
4. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above and in the request for fees and costs, and based on 
the arguments to be presented at the hearing on this request, it is respectfully requested 
that this Court grant the Petitioner reasonable fees and costs in this action. 
DATED this l-t&day of July, 2015. 
{k~ 
~es 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2Because this Court did not accept Respondent)s statutory arguments, the decision 
issued in this case did not need to reach the constitutional issued raised by the 
Department's unwarranted interpretation of the statute. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the )...1-"day of July, 201 I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method 
marked herein: 
TIMOTHY J. STOVER 
Special Deputy Attorney Generai 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248 
_:.::£ By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736-9929. 
By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the 
post office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
Ey;/; Q_ 
y ton 
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Parnes 
ANDREW PARNES, 
Attorney at Law 
671 First Avenue North 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 726-1010 
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COTJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEP ARTMEm ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014~784 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Date: August 24, 2015 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Judge: Hon. Robert J. Elgee 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, by and 
through her attorney of record, sets her hearing regarding attorney fees before the 
Honorable Robert J. Elgee on August 24, 2015 at the hour of 10:30 a.m. 
DATED this 28th day of July, 2015. r· ( 0 
! J \~\..- '£~----
NOTICE OF HEARING 
An~Parnes 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theBt day of July, 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method 
marked herein: 
TIMOTHY J. STOVER 
Special Deputy Attorney Generai 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248 
':f_ By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736~9929. 
By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the 
post office at Ketchum, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 2 
126 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2014-0000784 
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Ofldaho Department Of Transportation 
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney fees and Costs 
Hearing date: 8/24/2015 
Time: 10:29 am 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy Stover 
Party: Susan Warner, Attorney: Andrew Parnes 
Counter# 
10.33 Mr. Parnes present, Mr. Stover present by phone. 
Court introduces the case. 
10.34 Mr. Parnes addresses the Motion for Attorney fees and costs. 
10.38 Mr. Stover responds- the memorandum was not verified and was not filed 
timely. 
10.42 Court inquires. 
Mr. Parnes responds. 
10.51 Mr. Stover responds. 
10.52 Court inquires about the unreasonableness of the department 
Mr. Stover responds. 
10.53 Court takes the matter under advisement and will issue a written decision. 
10.54 Recess 
COURT MINUTES 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BLAINE COUNTY 
SUSAN JANE WARNER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No.: CV-2014-784 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
ATTORNEY FEES 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This matter came to the district court on appeal from the decision of a hearing officer 
affirming the Department of Transportation's (hereinafter ''the Department") suspension of 
Warner's driving privileges. Warner did not contest the fact that the Department could suspend 
her license upon a conviction for an out-of-state DUI. Rather, Warner contested the length of the 
suspension imposed by the Department, arguing it had no authority to impose a one year 
suspension. This court entered a written Decision on Appeal on the 25th day of June, 2015, 
reversing the decision of the hearing officer. The matter was remanded to the Department with 
instructions to shorten the period of Warner's suspension. The Department appealed that ruling 
on July 20, 2015. 
Warner submitted an application for attorney fees on July 9, 2015. The Department filed 
an Objection to Petitioner's Memorandum of Attorney Fees a.11.d Costs on July 16, 2015. Oral 
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Court on August 24, on the attorney at which 
took under advisement. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Warner's initial Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs was not verified or supported 
by affidavit. The Department has objected, citing Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878 (Ct. 
App.1984) and Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, (Ct.App.1985). The Department also 
contends that Warner has not provided sufficient information to the Court for the Court to 
evaluate the required factors enumerated in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3). Finally, the Department submits 
that, although the Court ruled against the Department on appeal, this Court cannot and should not 
find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law as required by Idaho 
Code§ 12-117. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Court will take the last issue first. 
Proceedings on Appeal. 
The Court agrees with Warner that the Department raised arguments on appeal before the 
district court that were not raised before the hearing officer, and that the Department found a 
decision of Judge McKee late in the process that required extra work of Warner's counsel. 
However, as pointed out by counsel for the Department, the Department prevailed before the 
hearing officer, and was defending itself on appeal, not prosecuting or re-presenting a dubious 
argument on appeal, where the Department had already lost before the hearing officer. In order 
to award Warner attorney fees on appeal, the Court would have to find that the Department's 
position on appeal, where it was defending itself, was without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
First, even if all the Department did on appeal was to argue that the hearing officer had decided 
the issue below correctly, it would be difficult if not impossible for the Court to conclude that the 
Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Second, in order for the Court to 
2 
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attorney of the Department once the case was on appeal, this Court would 
to that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in part 
arguing issues not presented below, or that added to Warner's workload. The Court is not aware 
of any authority, and has been directed to none, which allows the Court to look piecemeal at 
different arguments raised by a party at different phases of the administrative appeal process and 
to then award attorney fees for arguing over discrete and separate issues. In other contexts 
( e.g.-awards of fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121 ), the appellate courts of Idaho have frowned upon 
such awards. See, e.g., Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc,. 119 Idaho 626,630 
( 1990) (holding that in cases with multiple claims and defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate 
them to determine which were or were not frivolously defended or pursued.) Third, the 
Department on appeal raised some cogent objections to Warner's claim, such as the request for 
attorney fees was not timely or properly verified. 
In this Court's view, Idaho Code §12-117 requires the Court to view the case on an 
overall basis, and determine if the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law 
considering the totality of the circumstances of the case. The Court cannot find the Department 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, considering the case on an overall basis, in 
defending itself before the district court on appeal. 
Department's Position at the Outset. 
The other arguable alternative for a finding that the Department acted without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact is the argument that the Department took an unreasonable position 
in law or fact at the outset of the case, and has persisted in maintaining it. Under this analysis, 
Mr. Parnes argues that whatever the Department did or did not do on appeal before the district 
court is irrelevant. This argument, in other words, is that the Department should be responsible 
for all fees, even on appeal, if the Department took or maintained an unreasonable position early 
on that then required Warner to incur fees throughout that never should have been necessary. 
3 
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argument has merit, but only if the can find that Department's position has been 
a reasonable basis in fact or law from the beginning. 
It must be noted that there are no serious or material facts in issue. The facts are fairly 
straightforward. Warner got convicted of a DUI in Montana, and had a prior conviction for DUI 
in Idaho as shown by the Idaho Department of Transportation's records. The Montana court did 
not suspend Warner's license. The question is whether the Department can consult its own 
records in determining whether a driver convicted in another state has a prior offense, and use 
that in determining the length of the suspension, or whether the Department is bound by the 
record of conviction from the other state. Two Idaho statutes have been implicated, those being 
Idaho Code§ 49-324 and Idaho Code §49-326(l)(a) and (e). In fairness to the Department, Idaho 
Code §49-326(1) enables the Department to consult its own records. The question is how far and 
to what extent the Department is able to do so. Are they bound solely by the foreign judgment, or 
is the Department able to consider the foreign judgment as well as their own records? The Court 
has construed Idaho Code§ 49-326(1)(a) and (e) to mean that the Department does not have 
discretion to consider its own records, and make a determination that its own records, together 
with a record of a conviction, court order, or administrative action, permits the Department to 
come up with a license suspension length that combines the two. The statutes do not say that. 
Although the statute says the Department can consider its own records, whatever the Department 
considers has to provide sufficient evidence to show that the driver has committed an offense for 
which mandatory revocation or suspension is required (that has not been demonstrated here), or 
has, under subsection ( e ), committed an offense in another state or jurisdiction, as evidenced by a 
conviction, court order, or administrative action, which if committed in Idaho would be grounds 
for suspension. This subsection of the statute is more particularly tailored to present 
circumstances, and should govern in the event of any conflict with any other subsection. So, 
according to the plain language of the statute, although the Department can consult its records to 
4 
131 
see if they make the showing required, the subsections provide specifically what the record must 
what is to considered. The statute does not allow the Department to combine its 
records of other driver activity with the evidence of a conviction or record of the foreign offense 
in order to come up with the Department's own idea of how long the suspension should be for. 
The long and short of this analysis is that it was not unreasonable for the Department to 
take the position that the statute did allow it to consider its own records in making the 
determination of the proper length of suspension. Although the Court disagreed, that does not, by 
itself, mean that the Department took an unreasonable position from the outset, and refused to let 
go of their untenable position. 
The Court concludes the Department has not acted without a reasonable basis in law or 
fact, and Warner's application for an award of attorney fees and costs on that basis is denied. 
DATED this .Jj_ day of September, 2015. 
RoOOrtJ~~ 
District Judge 
5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY that on this ;L{ day of September, 5, I caused to be served a 
true of the foregoing ORDER, document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Andrew Parnes, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 5988 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
aparnes@mindspring.com 
Timothy Stover, Esq. 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
905 Shoshone Street North 
PO Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
wf s @, NlCtj i t-va ~ IP w .l.fn.---. 
6 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
/....-FA-*- ex-,-"-A \ \ 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
_ Overnight Mail 
!.-F:A:X ~ \ \ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SUSAN 
Petitioner/ Respondent, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
RespondenU Appellant, 
Supreme Court No. 43484 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the following documents will be submitted as 
exhibits to the Record: 
Court Exhibits 
-Agency Record lodged December 31, 2014 
-Transcript- Administrative License Suspension Hearing on October 28, 2014 lodged January 20, 2015 
-Amended Agency Record lodged February 24, 2015 
Petitioner's Exhibits at Oral Argument on Appeal Hearing 
A Department's File (Opinions/Briefs) ADMITTED 5/4/2015 
2 IN WITNES~Wf-!EREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this __.b::=- day of UC.:tc}o.e£:- , 2015. 
Jolynn D~e Court 
By b/\c-
Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
vs. 
WARNER, 
Petitioner/Respondent, 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 43484 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Supplemental Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a 
true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant. 
I do further certify that all, if any, exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Supplemental Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript 
on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at Hailey, Idaho, this j_ day of C'.):::,\n'oP:C 2015. 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court 
By CJ) A?t k:v\ / 
Crystal Rigby, Deputy Cieri<~ 
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IN 
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JUDICIAL 
NTY OF BLAINE 
Supreme Court No. 43484 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and 
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ANDREW PARNES 
PO Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
TIMOTHY J. STOVER 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303 
Attorney for Petitioner/Respondent Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court this .1--- day of QC-dv~ , 2015. 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
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